The
German Occupation
From the
Beginning of the Occupation Until the Establishment of the Ghettos
(June 23, 1941-October 31, 1941)
The Fall of
the City. On the night of June 22/23, 1941, the German army reached
the outskirts of Grodno and the Soviet forces retreated in panic,
taking with them only their own people and local residents who had
worked in the administrative apparatus.
The German
advance was accompanied by heavy aerial bombardment of the city and
the surrounding towns. Before dawn the Germans launched a massive
barrage against the army depots at the edge of the city. The bombing
from the air continued relentlessly throughout the day, the planes
making repeated sorties. Incendiary bombs sparked a huge fire on
both banks of the Nieman. Much of the suburb across the Nieman went
up in flames, including the ancient synagogue. The Jewish hospital
sustained heavy damage.
The
terrified Jews, watching the Russians flee, made for the cellars and
shelters (and some were wounded or killed by the bombs that fell
near the cellars). Many Jews, particularly young people, fled
wildly, without any specific destination, on foot, by bicycle, or in
wagons. The roads were littered with bodies and abandoned weapons.
Some managed to board vehicles or to join groups that formed during
the course of the evacuation; but few succeeded in reaching Russia.
The Germans were usually ahead of them and forced them to return to
Grodno.
Two months
later soldiers from the Spanish Legion who participated in the
combat against the Soviet Union passed through Grodno on their way
to the frontier. They were appalled at the spectacle of ruin and
devastation in every part of Grodno. According to one description,
one-third of the city lay in ruins, and in the Across the River
residential suburb not a house remained intact. In total contrast to
the Germans, the Spaniards showed compassion for the Jews during
their short stay in Grodno.
The German
Administrative Machinery in the Bialystok District and the Grodno
Subdistrict. On July 17, 1941, by a special order, the Bialystok
district was annexed to eastern Prussia as a separate administrative
unit, called Generalbezirk Bialystok. At first Grodno was not
included in this district but remained part of the
Generalkommissariat Byelorussia.Then, on September 18, 1941, it was
attached to the Bialystok district, even though the annexation did
not become official until March 1942.
About two
months after the city's capture, members of the Byelorussian
National Committee informed on the Polish mayor, Zawicki, alleging
that he was collaborating with the Communists and the Jews. He was
thereupon replaced with a German mayor, Georg Stein, who also served
as Municipal Commissar (Stadtkommissar). Stein frequently ignored
his direct superior, von Ploetz, and consulted directly with the
governor (Oberpresident) of the Bialystok district.
In addition
to the civilian system, a security apparatus was responsible for
dealing with terror against the population. The German police in the
Bialystok district was composed of the Order Police
(Ordnungspolizei), the City Police (Schutzpolizei or Schupo), the
gendarmerie and the security units - the Security Police
(Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo) and the Security Service
(Sicherheitsdienst or SD). Units of the police and the Security
Service arrived in Grodno in July 1941. A district headquarters of
the SD, the Gestapo, and the Criminal Police (Kriminalpolizei or
Kripo) was established around April 1942, headed by Dr. Wilhelm
Altenloh.
When Grodno
was attached to the Bialystok district, a Gestapo deputy office
(Nebenstelle) was set up there, initially headed by
Kriminalsekretaer Gross, and, from December 1941, by Heinz Errelis.
The office
was raised to independent level (Aussenstelle) after the Security
Service established a headquarters (KDS) in Bialystok. Errelis had
thirteen men under his command, including his deputy, Schott; Gross,
who was in charge of Jewish affairs; Kurt Wiese, who would afterward
become the commandant of Ghetto One; Otto Streblow, commandant of
Ghetto Two; Karl Rinzler, commandant of the Kielbasin concentration
camp; Niestroj; three interpreters, two drivers, and two
stenographers.
Creation of
the Judenrat. At the end of June 1941, two German officers ordered
lawyer Izaak Gozhanski to establish a Jewish representative body.
However, Gozhanski was evasive, claiming his German was not good
enough. Instead he recommended David Brawer, who, since 1939, was
the headmaster of the local Tarbut school. Brawer, too, saw the
appointment as a horrendous disaster, but was given no choice. He
was summoned to the military commander and ordered to form a
Judenrat of ten people within twenty-four hours and to lead it as
head of the Jewish population in the city of Grodno (Obman der
Juedische Bevoelkerung der Stadt Grodno). Brawer asked all the
Jewish organizations and parties (as they had existed until
September 1939) to appoint representatives. On June 28, 1941, they
already met.
It was a
turbulent session. Some of those present argued against establishing
a Jewish representation for fear that this would only facilitate the
persecutions; others argued that the serious situation of the Jews
in the city called for the immediate creation of a representative
body that would work both to moderate the German decrees and to
relieve the physical distress of the population. Many had been left
destitute by the great fire that had heralded the occupation, and
the number of sick and needy had increased greatly. It was
imperative to provide them with clothing, footwear, food and medical
services.
The
advocates of representation won out, and at the meeting it was
decided to establish a Judenrat. Even though officially its function
was limited to carrying out the occupier's orders, in practice the
Judenrat executed a wide range of functions, including those that in
the past had been the responsibility of extra-communal elements.
Thus, by the time the Jews were incarcerated in the ghettos, the
Judenrat was already dealing with a broad array of community
affairs. First to be activated were the departments for medical aid
and relief and the labor department, which tried to introduce order
into the forced-labor mobilizations and put an end to the spate of
kidnappings (see below).
By
September 7, 1941, the Judenrat had more than doubled in size, to
twenty-four members, as is evident from the list that Brawer had to
submit to the German Civil Administration when the Jews were placed
under its
authority. The list included individuals from various strata of the
Jewish population who had been active in the community before
September 1939, and it specified their roles and functions. One of
the names on the list was that of the lawyer Izaak Gozhanski.
Decrees,
Kidnappings, Murders. With the occupation the Jews were immediately
placed outside the law. Their lives and security were of no
consequence or concern. Jewish youngsters disappeared without a
trace from the streets; a similar fate befell hospitalized adults
and children, the elderly in old-age homes, and members of the
Jewish intelligentsia. An Einsatzgruppen (the German execution
units) report of July 13, 1941, includes a survey of operations
executed by the Einsatz-kommando in which ninety-six Jews were put
to death in Grodno and Lida. The true number was probably far
higher; according to one source,9 the Germans combed the town with
lists in hand and arrested hundreds of members of the educated and
intellectual stratum. At least 100 were shot.
In the
absence of law, the lives of the Jews were regulated by orders and
edicts, some of which were published post factum. About twelve days
after the Germans entered the city, all the Jews were required to
register and the word Jude was stamped on their identity cards. Soon
a whole series of restrictions and prohibitions were enforced. For
example, Jews were forbidden to walk on the sidewalks; they had to
walk in the middle of the road in single file (duck-walk).
Consequently, many were hit by passing vehicles, and Jews arriving
at hospitals after being injured in road accidents became a common
sight. Jews were also forbidden to use public transportation or to
enter places of leisure, sports arenas, theaters, museums and
libraries; nor were they permitted to own a vehicle, radio, or even
a cow or horse. On the street Jews had to lift their hat to passing
Germans. All contact between Jews and non-Jews was banned.
On June 30,
1941, an order issued in Grodno made it mandatory for Jews to wear
an identifying badge. At first this was a white armband with a blue
Star of David; a month later the armband was replaced by two large
yellow patches worn on the left side of the chest and on the left of
the back. Children were exempt from this decree. Anyone caught
without the patches was severely punished, not only risking arrest
but having to endure a savage beating that left the victim ailing
for weeks or even months.
As we have
already indicated, the authorities did not always publish a judicial
order before implementing it. A flagrant example of this method was
forced labor, which was introduced immediately after the occupation.
It was not until two months later, on August 16, 1941, that the
relevant official order was published. The Jews had to report every
morning near the synagogue, from where they were taken by government
bodies, such as the army or the municipality, to work at various
types of labor. The general work companies cleared stones from the
streets, repaired roads, and cleaned the barracks of the occupying
forces. Public works such as clearing snow, paving roads, and
cleaning streets were considered to be for the general good and were
not recompensed. The order was accompanied by the threat of
punishment against those who did not work, but even those who did
were beaten, abused and humiliated.
Only those
with vital professions, who received work permits, were assured
permanent employment and were spared the brutal experience of the
mass concentration in the morning and the grueling unskilled labor.
When the
Grodno subdistrict was annexed to the Bialystok district (see
below), the laws and regulations in effect in the latter were also
applied to the former. On October 15, 1941, the first official order
was promulgated for the entire district regarding forced labor; it
specified the ages of those who were obligated to work - males aged
fourteen to sixty and women aged fourteen to fifty-five. A more
detailed order from
April 1,
1942, was directed to all the district's Jews, stipulating execution
as the punishment for evasion.
On
September 29, 1941, Abraham Lifszyc, director of the Judenrat's
commerce and industry department, submitted to the city
administration a list of craftsmen and skilled workers for whom he
sought work permits. The list mentions an extraordinary range of
professions: technicians, locksmiths, brushers, milliners, wood
carvers, chimney sweeps, tile layers, road pavers, wagoners, soap
makers, pot menders, blacksmiths, sheet-metal workers, barrel
builders, furriers, watchmakers, bakers, stove stokers, and many
more - all told, 600 professions and crafts.
In theory,
the work permits were intended solely for skilled craftsmen, but the
Judenrat's labor department tried to assist the members of the
liberal professions as well and was sometimes able to obtain
craftsmen's certificates for them. Jewish permit-holders were
supposed to earn 60 percent of the wages of local workers. Of this,
50 percent was deducted for the Municipal Commissar, 12 percent went
to social insurance, and the remaining 38 percent was transferred to
the Judenrat, which had to supply food. The workers themselves
received no wages.
Confiscations,
Contributions, Dispossession. From the first day of the occupation,
a campaign of confiscation and robbery was launched. Before the Jews
were incarcerated in the ghetto, German officers and soldiers would
visit their homes and take whatever caught their fancy. The
authorities also constantly ordered the Judenrat to supply them with
furniture, clothing, eating utensils, footwear and so forth. On one
occasion the Germans demanded thirty chairs and thirty white
tablecloths within two days; another time it was cutlery, furniture,
boots, and curtains.
There were
also contributions (ransom payments) in money and valuables. Already
at the end of June 1941, the Jews were obligated to raise one
million rubles, with the Judenrat's financial department responsible
for the implementation. Within two months the Jews were told to
contribute some $200,000. The Grodno municipality also took its
share of Jewish property, exploiting the existing decrees and adding
some of its own. If differences arose between the municipality and
the Judenrat, the Germans automatically sided with the former. A
case in point concerned the restrictions that the municipality
imposed on workshops that had existed for dozens of years and on
those that received permits on July 23. The municipality barred the
operation of various types of workshops - locksmiths, sewing,
sheet-metal - and also carpentries, bakeries, and shoemakers' shops.
On July 24, Brawer complained to the military commander. Two days
later he was informed that the Germans supported the municipality's
stand. Moreover, the commander ordered the municipal administration
to place Aryans in the Jews' shops so as to ensure continuity in the
city's economic life.
Two months
later, when the Jews on two main streets - Dominikanska and
Orzeszkowej - were forced to leave their homes and move elsewhere,
they were forbidden to take their belongings.
The
First Year in the Ghettos (November 1941-November 1942): The Stable
Period
Establishment
of the Ghettos. In November 1941, shortly after Grodno was annexed
to the Bialystok district, the city's Jews were transferred to two
ghettos about 2 km. apart from each other. This separation would
later facilitate the Germans' ability to exterminate the occupants.
The smaller ghetto was liquidated a year after its establishment,
while the larger one survived it by a few months. Two main criteria
determined the ghettos' location: less need to transfer the Jews
from place to place within the city; and an attempt to worsen their
situation to the maximum by concentrating them in areas where the
physical surroundings - sanitation, water and electricity, roads,
etc. - were not adequate for the occupants' needs.
A week
before the Jews entered the ghettos, Commissar von Ploetz issued an
order to the commissars of the various units:
"Jews
cannot own real estate. When the Jews enter the ghetto, they will
lose their property. Aryans who lived in the ghetto or have property
there should receive in exchange the houses that will be emptied of
Jews. Jews' real estate belongs to the Reich." (Yad Vashem
Archives, JM/11200, Fond 1, OPIS 1, Del 15, 23.10.1941 no. 11)
The first
ghetto (Ghetto One) was established in the city's ancient central
section, in the area of the fortress, around the synagogue compound
(Shulhoif). Jews had constituted the majority of the population in
this area even before the founding of the ghetto, but now some
15,000 Jews were crammed into an area less than half a square km. It
covered the synagogue courtyard as far as Wilenska Street on one
side and as far as the northern section of Zamkowa (renamed Burg)
Street on the other side. Surrounding the ghetto was a 2-meter-high
fence, part of which passed through the backyards of houses along
Dominikanska (renamed Hindenburg) Street, one of the city's main
thoroughfares. The entry to the ghetto was from Zamkowa Street,
where it met Ciasna Street, which led into the ghetto. The fence on
Zamkowa Street was erected between the sidewalk and the road, and
Jews were forbidden to use the front entrance to the houses on that
street. Some of the houses on the other side of the street were
demolished. The area and boundaries of the ghetto were not fixed; as
the transports proceeded it kept diminishing in size, until finally
it included only a few buildings on Zamkowa Street.
The second
ghetto (Ghetto Two) was created in the Slobodka suburb, behind the
railway tracks, to the right of the road leading to Skidel Street,
opposite the market square and the barracks area. This part of the
city was broader and more open, with fewer houses. Some 10,000 Jews
were incarcerated in this ghetto, which was larger in size than the
main ghetto but more dilapidated. It, too, was sealed off with a
fence, which ran along Skidel Street parallel to the road. The
entrance to the ghetto was from Artyleryjska (afterward renamed
Kremer) Street.
Generally
Jews were sent to one ghetto or the other based on their work; the
first ghetto was intended for productive workers, the second for the
unproductive. Consequently, even the Jews of Grodno were led into
believing that Ghetto One was meant primarily for skilled workers
and that its occupants enjoyed automatic protection, whereas the
authorities had no use for those in Ghetto Two and their lives were
therefore in danger. Before they entered the ghetto the
professionals were ordered to obtain a work permit. Panic spread
throughout the city, and long lines formed outside the Judenrat
offices for the permit. Many were granted such certificates and
entered the first ghetto even though they were not artisans, while
some vitally needed professionals were forced into Ghetto Two.
The
evacuation of the Jews from their homes and their transfer to the
ghetto was executed swiftly and without consideration for the harsh
weather. The Jews were given only six hours (from noon until 6 P.M.)
to move their belongings - without the use of vehicles - and the
result was that thousands of Jews streamed toward the gates of the
ghetto. The night brought with it the first snow, and many of the
evacuees fashioned homemade sleds to facilitate their move. Although
the authorities barred anyone who entered the ghetto from leaving
again, many managed to go back and forth to their homes several
times in order to remove additional items. Frequently the Jews
encountered Polish hooligans who attacked and looted them, despite
the authorities' explicit prohibition of the presence of non-Jews in
the streets while the Jews were being transferred to the ghettos.
Those whose
houses were inside the ghetto had to share them with the newcomers,
whereas the Jews who were evicted from their homes were ordered to
find alternative lodgings. Some acted promptly, seized an apartment,
and moved some of their belongings. Others turned for help to the
Judenrat's housing department, which was established at the same
time as the ghettos. Housing became an acute problem and preoccupied
the entire presidium of the Judenrat. Because of the overcrowding
and the shortage of flats, hundreds of families remained without a
roof over their heads, and the streets were filled with piles of
furniture and bedding. The synagogue and the batei midrash were also
converted into quasi-lodgings. Those with good connections received
better apartments, but the Judenrat realized that a general solution
had to be found, as winter was approaching. A housing committee,
headed by lawyer Fuerstenberg, was set up, and within two or three
weeks an arrangement had been found for everyone. To relieve the
congestion, the housing department turned to the construction
department, which renovated old buildings and in some cases actually
built new apartments. For example, the Slobodka barracks, which
became the site of the Judenrat office in Ghetto Two, were
completely renovated.
Safety and
order inside the ghetto were the responsibility of the Jewish
Police, while outside the ghetto the German Schupo was in charge -
until November 2, 1942, when the ghettos were closed. German
policemen, under the command of Franz Osterode, manned the entrance
to the ghetto, checking exit passes and examining those returning
from work. In particular they searched the starving Jews for food
they might be trying to smuggle into the ghetto. Serving under
Osterode were some 40-50 German policemen and a similar number of
local auxiliary police.
The Gestapo
headquarters in Grodno was located on Hoovera Street (the house of
Dr. Finkel). After the ghettos were sealed off permanently, on
November 2, 1942, and no one was permitted to enter or leave, the
Gestapo moved its command post into a former Jewish shop near the
entrance to Ghetto One, to facilitate more efficient supervision of
the Jews' movements.
Organizing
Life in the Ghettos. Upon the establishment of the two ghettos, the
Grodno Judenrat also split into two. In the first ghetto its offices
were in the three buildings of the former Yavneh School on Zamkowa
Street, and in the second ghetto, as mentioned, in the renovated
barracks. In both ghettos parallel institutions and departments were
set up to deal with key spheres, such as finances, health and
clinics, work, kitchens, and so forth. The heads of the two
Judenrats were both lawyers, Izaak Gozhanski in Ghetto One and
Avraham Zadai in Ghetto Two, and both were subordinate to David
Brawer.
For a time
the ghetto became a kind of autonomous Jewish city, with only
technical connections to the general municipal area, such as for the
supply of power and water. The Jews' incarceration and their
severance from government and municipal services forced the Judenrat
to assume many new tasks, such as providing food and housing,
maintaining workshops, and ensuring the operation of such services
as health, police, courts, and so forth. The relative quiet that
characterized the first year of the ghettos enabled the Judenrat to
ease the Jews' plight by creating a very large bureaucratic
apparatus, which in itself became a source of livelihood for many
ghetto occupants. Some 850 individuals were employed by the
Judenrats of the two ghettos. The Grodno Judenrat consisted of
thirteen departments, which dealt with nearly every facet of life.
The departments' power and authority were dependent on the
conditions in the ghetto and on the nature and scale of the Germans'
demands. Thus, the supply, work, and confiscations departments
wielded more power than the others.
The
Judenrat's staff was exempt from forced labor and, for a time, from
transports as well. The Judenrat also endeavored to protect the core
of the community's intelligentsia as long as it was able.
Financial
and Economic Operations. The Judenrat took upon itself an enormous
range of tasks, and its expenses were correspondingly immense. Large
sums had to be paid to the municipality in exchange for the
apartments in the ghettos and the supply of water and electricity.
The Judenrat also underwrote the renovation of residential dwellings
and of offices for the Germans; it developed workshops, maintained
health and sanitation services, assisted the needy, and paid wages
to its staff. In addition, it frequently had to bribe Germans with
cash or with goods such as furs, clothing, new furniture, and the
like.
The finance
department - headed by Yehoshua Suchovlanski, a former Grodno deputy
mayor who was a gifted economist and a pillar of the ghetto economy
- coped successfully with these prodigious difficulties and was able
to cover the Judenrat's vast expenditures. Established in June 1941,
the finance department was ordered, as its first task, to collect
from the Jewish community a ransom payment of one million rubles for
the Germans.
Initially
only the affluent were taxed, but gradually a broader taxation
system came into being which remained in effect until the ghettos'
liquidation. The Judenrat's revenues derived from property tax (paid
by the wealthy), income tax, rent, income from the ghetto workshops,
payments for electricity and water, and payments for release from
forced labor, all according to means.
The
concentration of the Jews in the ghettos was a devastating blow to
their economic activity. To begin with, they were cut off completely
from the longstanding and vital economic ties which they had formed
with the city's non-Jews.
Judenrat
head Brawer considered the supply of food to the ghetto to be one of
the Judenrat's major functions. Thanks to his influence and his
intercession with the German army and the civilian authorities, he
was able to procure for the ghetto a larger food allocation. Ya'akov
Efron, the director of the supply department, also spared no effort,
and the combination of his organizational skill and the intensive
endeavors of the Judenrat overall, meant that the food situation in
the Grodno ghetto was less severe than in other ghettos. True, as
was usually the case, the affluent enjoyed better conditions and the
poor made do with the scraps; but the fact remains that in Grodno,
in contrast to other ghettos in Poland, no one died of starvation.
In both
ghettos, food was distributed to holders of ration cards at special
stations. The supply department provided the bakeries with flour,
wood or coals for fuel, and salt. The ghetto occupants received
about 200 grams of bread a day in return for a token payment. The
Judenrat also ran a butcher shop, in which meat (usually horse meat)
was available from time to time for card-holders. Potatoes were
stored in the cellar of the Great Synagogue and were distributed
there.
In both
ghettos the public kitchens played a major role. The kitchen in
Ghetto One was located in the Great Synagogue (to the left of the
main entrance), and in Ghetto Two in the basement of the match
factory. The commodities were furnished by the supply department.
Meals were
usually served with without (i.e., without meat or fat), but a hot,
nourishing broth was prepared and served with a piece of bread
(50-100 grams). Occasionally, when the kitchens received a bit of
meat or some bones, a separate pot was used for those who wanted
kosher food.
On some
days the kitchen in Ghetto One served up to 3,000 meals, in return
for a token payment - the only hot meal for hundreds of families.
The poor and the indigent received meals free of charge, upon
presentation of a document from the social-welfare department. The
kitchens were particularly important in the winter months, when the
shortage of trees left whole families without fuel and subsequently
they could not heat water for drinking. In return for a minuscule
payment, or even for free, a hot drink could be had in the kitchens
(barley coffee) from 5 A.M. to 8 A.M. and from 7 P.M. until 9 P.M.
Nearly all the workers came in for a morning coffee.
In both
ghettos, plots of land and gardens were worked at the initiative of
the supply department. In Ghetto One the land in question was
located in the old Jewish cemetery; in Ghetto Two it was the large
square opposite the Jewish orphanage, on the way to Skidel (formerly
the He-Halutz garden). Some plots were located next to Yosilevich's
match factory, where potatoes, beets, cabbages, and onions were
grown. The work was done by Jewish gardeners. For a time the Germans
let the Jews go on working their former gardens, which were now
outside the ghetto, particularly in the residential suburb. An
agricultural course lasting more than six months was held, and the
participants were exempt from work.
Work Inside
and Outside the Ghetto. The occupants of the Grodno ghetto, like
their brethren in many other ghettos across Poland, adopted the
slogan, salvation through work. In other words, nearly everyone
believed that as long as the Germans considered the ghetto occupants
to be productive elements who were useful to their economy, they
would let them live. The Germans, for their part, helped cultivate
the idea that work inside and outside the ghetto for their war
industry would protect the Jews from extermination. The Judenrat
also advocated this approach. Brawer even went to Bialystok in order
to study methods of establishing and managing small factories, and a
variety of workshops and plants were set up in the ghetto to supply
goods to the city proper, to the army, and to the Gestapo.
Jews from
both ghettos also worked outside. The labor department, which had
been set up in the first days of the Judenrat in order to supply the
required number of Jews for forced labor and other duties, was in
charge of arranging the work in the ghettos. The gathering place for
the Jewish workers was by the gate. In the pre-ghetto period all the
Jews had to report for work daily, although they were taken outside
for forced labor only a few times a week. Those who worked outside
the ghetto received a food card and were entitled to bread and meat
according to the rations given to the working class.
The labor
department had a large bureaucratic apparatus that kept an exact
record of all Jews, the fit and the unfit for work, according to
their professions and their labor brigades. Some brigades had a
better reputation than others and workers vied with one another to
join them. Such were the brigades that worked for the Gestapo; to
get a job with them meant safety for the workers and their families.
Because so many wanted to join these brigades, their leaders could
earn good money in return for accepting workers. But some other
brigade leaders were also considered strong and well-connected, and
took money from workers. Bribe-taking incensed the Judenrat, which
monitored the heads of the departments and frequently replaced them.
Orders for workers came from the German Ministry of Labor, which
also issued the work permits for individuals and for groups. Some
Jews worked separately as skilled professionals and received
personal permits, whereas for groups that did a particular job a
collective permit was issued stating the number of workers. In the
latter case, those in charge could maneuver and mobilize different
people each time. Work permits carried a time limit but could be
extended. They had to state the exact place where the work was being
done and the time it commenced. Jews worked ten hours a day, and
anyone who was late or left the site without permission was
punished. Some were even executed on the charge that they displayed
contempt for work or because they had been playing cards during
working hours.
Artisans
were paid 0.45 marks an hour, trained workers received 0.38 marks an
hour, and simple laborers got 0.35 marks. Women were paid 75 percent
of the men's salary. As already mentioned, half the salary was
deducted for the Grodno Commissar's office, and the remainder also
did not reach the workers directly but was paid to the Judenrat.
The records
of the payments that were transferred to the municipality for Jewish
workers show that in addition to working for the army and the city,
they were utilized in various factories - for the manufacture of
leather, tiles, juices, bricks and plywood, and beer - and in a
sawmill, a carpentry workshop, on roads, in the offices of the
district administration, and elsewhere.
Most of the
Jews preferred to work outside the ghetto, as this entitled them to
higher salaries, better food rations, and even enabled them to
smuggle food into the ghetto. Moreover, the work permit gave its
holders a sense of protection from the various orders and edicts.
Yet there were also wealthy Jews who had the means to find others to
replace them, paying both them and the Judenrat. To fill the work
quotas, Jewish policemen, in return for a few marks, would sometimes
round up beggars and send them to work in place of the well-to-do.
Eventually the system became institutionalized and the labor
department itself made such arrangements.
The Ghetto
Shops and Workshops. Inside the ghetto there were a number of
private shops that sold smuggled goods or products manufactured in
the ghetto in privately owned workshops. The latter produced shoes,
sheet-metal, garments and other necessities of life. Some of their
products were destined for clients outside the ghetto. The
Judenrat's commerce and crafts department collected a tax on signs.
The stands were only semi-legal, and the shopkeepers would close
their businesses whenever Gestapo and SS personnel, or even ordinary
Germans, appeared in the ghetto - usually to inquire about the
origin of the items on sale.
Some
well-to-do artisans established small plants in the ghetto; two of
them produced cooking oil (one belonged to Meir Trachtenberg), and
the others made artificial honey, starch, candies, and flour. Their
owners became wealthy (in terms of the place and the time) and had
to pay taxes to the Judenrat's finance, commerce and crafts
departments. As a rule, these plants were kept hidden from the
Germans.
Von Ploetz,
the Grodno subdistrict commissar, took a leaf from the Bialystok
ghetto and opened additional workshops in Grodno. The idea was to
produce items for the German war economy and to supply the personal
needs of army and Gestapo personnel stationed in Grodno.
The new
workshops were therefore considered to be of prime importance. Among
their products were shoes and boots in large quantities, brown
shirts and skiing equipment for the army, and felt shoes for the
German police. The German-run workshops received large orders from
the army, as for instance: 4,000 army shirts, 20,000 pairs of
slippers, 30,000 pairs of felt shoes, 15,000 pairs of leather shoes,
work clothes, processing 40,000 meters of cloth, padded jackets and
trousers, as well as large numbers of brushes and paintbrushes. The
Germans supplied the raw materials.
In their
workshops the Germans employed the most highly skilled workers; the
permits issued to them were considered tantamount to life insurance.
Many, then, were prepared to pay a great deal to be assigned to
these workshops. Others drew on their connections in the Judenrat, a
situation that made for much envy.
The City
Commissar kept close watch on the Jews' work. If the productivity
rates fell, he used severe pressure and even threatened to send all
involved to a work-education camp, where these unproductive elements
would be re-educated under strict supervision. And indeed, such a
camp had been established by the Grodno municipality. The detention
in the camp usually lasted from two weeks to six months; it
contained separate sections for Aryans, for Jews and for women. The
camp was first activated after Easter 1942, but there is nothing to
suggest that Jews from Grodno and its surroundings were re-educated
there.
Liquidation
of the Ghettos and the Deportations to the Camps (November 2,
1942-March 12, 1942)
In late
1942, exactly a year after Grodno's Jews had been herded into the
ghettos, the Germans began making preparations for transporting them
to the death camps. In the winter of 1942/1943, when the transports
ceased elsewhere in Poland (in the Generalgouvernement and in the
Warthegau), it was the turn of the Jews in the Bialystok District.
There were about 130,000 Jews in 116 localities, including 35,000 in
nineteen locales in the Grodno subdistrict.
The
officials responsible for the transports in the Grodno Subdistrict
were Heinz Errelis, the chief of the Gestapo in the city, and his
deputy, Erich Schott. To ensure that timing was coordinated
throughout the subdistrict, large forces were placed at their
disposal from the Gestapo, Sipo (Security Police), Kripo (Criminal
Police), Schupo, gendarmerie, and units of the local auxiliary
police.
Transit
camps, or as the Germans called them Sammellagger, which were
actually stations on the way to deportation to the death camps, were
set up at various sites in the Bialystok district. Probably the
Germans adopted this method because nearly all their means of
transportation were tied up at Stalingrad, where the battle raged.
The sites of the transit camps were chosen for their proximity to
Jewish places of residence - the barracks of the Tenth Battalion in
Bialystok, the Kielbasin camp next to Grodno, Bogusze, adjacent to
Grajewo, a temporary camp outside the city of Wolkowysk, and Zambrow
camp close by Lomz. From the transit camps the Jews were transported
to Auschwitz and Treblinka. Jews from the Bielsk-Podloski
subdistrict, in the southern part of the district, were sent
directly to nearby Treblinka without passing through a transit camp.
The
horrific conditions in the transit camps - overcrowding, inhuman
living quarters, nonexistent sanitation, serious food shortages,
bitter cold, and unspeakable filth - were most conducive to illness
and epidemics. The mortality rate was high. Inmates were also
subjected to all manners of harassments, beatings, abuse, and even
outright murder by the staff and guards.
Sealing off
the Grodno Ghettos and the Onset of the Murders. On November 2,
1942, Ghettos One and Two in Grodno were completely sealed off.
In the
morning the workers from Ghetto Two were held up at the gate, and
suddenly the commandants of the two ghettos, Kurt Wiese (Ghetto One)
and Otto Streblow (Ghetto Two), appeared and began shooting at the
workers indiscriminately. Twelve Jews were killed, forty were
wounded, and the others fled wildly in panic. It was the first time
that Grodno's Jews had experienced sudden mass murder, perpetrated
without warning. In the evening, the news spread through the city
that the Jews from the neighboring towns had been transported to the
Kielbasin camp.
No one went
out to work on the first day of the ghetto's closure, but from the
next day until November 16, a small work force - those employed by
the Wehrmacht and the Gestapo - was allowed to leave. However, for
the first time they were kept under heavy guard.
The sealing
of the two ghettos was accompanied by show-hangings and acts of
group murder. The first hanging took place in the first half of
November 1942. The victims were Lena Prenska (the daughter of a
well-known tailor), and a refugee from Warsaw named Drucker - both
had been caught on the Aryan side of the city - and Moshe Spindler,
the superintendent of the apartment building in which Lena resided,
for not reporting her absence. The three were taken to a central
site in the ghetto and hanged in front of the Judenrat and other
Jews who were ordered to watch the spectacle. When Aharon Rubinczik,
the head of the Jewish Police, balked at tying the noose around the
victims' necks, Wiese did it himself. The bodies were left on the
gallows until the next day as a warning to potential offenders.
This first
hanging was widely publicized, but public executions continued until
the ghetto's liquidation. Grodno survivors remember well a group
execution in February 1943, just before the city was declared
Judenrein.
Punitive
executions were meted out not only for trying to escape. The fate of
anyone caught smuggling food into the ghetto was also sealed.
Shooting of Jews who were found carrying bread or other food became
routine. The Lipsky brothers were shot when they were caught trying
to smuggle in food in a cart. One died and the other was sent to a
concentration camp. Kimhe was shot to death for bringing in a
chicken, Zalman Goldschmid over a liter of milk - a few examples out
of many.
Evacuation
of Ghetto Two. About two weeks after the Jews in the neighboring
towns were taken to Kielbasin, the Germans began liquidating Ghetto
Two. First, however, they transferred those with useful professions
from Ghetto Two to Ghetto One. Errelis informed the Judenrat in
Ghetto One that Ghetto Two would soon be evacuated but that Ghetto
One would remain intact for the time being. All essential Jews were
moved from Ghetto Two to Ghetto One. On the first day of the
transfer, November 9, 1942, many Ghetto Two inmates crowded around
the gate in the hope of joining the fortunate individuals who were
being moved. The Germans fired into the crowd, killing seven and
wounding many others; the latter were prevented from receiving
medical aid. This demonstration of force had its effect: fewer
people congregated at the gate the next day. Still, on these two
days many did manage to steal across or use various ruses in order
to enter the supposedly safer Ghetto One. All told, some 4,000
professionals and their families were transferred to Ghetto One.
The first
deportation from Ghetto Two took place on November 15, 1942. It was
preceded by the publication of a notice listing the streets that
were to be evacuated and threatening execution for those who spread
false and misleading rumors. The Jews were told that they were being
sent to work, and, according to the testimony of Grodno survivors
who reached Bialystok in 1943, the Judenrat and the other Jews in
the ghetto believed this tale. Therefore, very few tried to hide. On
the night of the transport, the entrance to the ghetto and the road
to the train station were illuminated. Passenger and freight cars
were in the station, and both Wiese and Streblow were present.
The
deportees reached Auschwitz on November 18, and before they were
murdered they were given prepared postcards on which a sentence in
German was printed: Being treated well, we are working and
everything is fine. They were ordered to sign the postcards and
address them to their relatives in Grodno.
The first
deportation was followed by a brief lull in Ghetto Two. But a few
days later, on November 21, everyone still in the ghetto was
deported to Auschwitz. Included in this transport were Jewish
policemen and members of the Ghetto Two Judenrat, including its
chairman.
There are
various differences regarding the number of deportees. Some sources
mention 1,500-2,000 people in the first transport and 2,000-3,500 in
the second. According to the records of Danuta Czech,( Danuta Czech,
Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager
Auschwitz-Birkenau, Rowohlt, 1989, pp. 336-337, 348, 354.)the first
transport contained 1,000 Jews, of whom 165 men and 65 women were
selected for work. Everyone else went straight to their death. The
second transport, which reached Auschwitz on November 25, contained
2,000 Jews; of these, 305 men and 128 women were selected for work;
again, all the others were murdered immediately. Probably at least
4,000 inhabitants of the ghetto - those remaining in Ghetto Two
after the transfer of a similar number of Jews to Ghetto One -
perished in Auschwitz. With the liquidation of the ghetto, a few
dozen more Jews were discovered; they were transferred to the
Kielbasin camp (see below).
After the
liquidation of Ghetto Two in Grodno and of the smaller ghettos in
the vicinity, German officials warned about the projected economic
consequences of eliminating the Jewish work force, particularly in
the crafts, which had nearly all been in Jewish hands. However, once
the decision to annihilate all the Jews had been made, economic
considerations became unimportant; the head of the subdistrict tried
to reassure the military elements who needed the ghetto workshops
that the Judenaktion would have only a minor impact on the economy.
Concurrently, the Germans readied themselves to train substitute
manpower in the crafts.
Evacuation
of Ghetto One. The deportations from Ghetto One began at the end of
November 1942, following the opening of the Kielbasin transit camp;
they followed a different pattern from previous Aktionen in the
region's ghettos and in Ghetto Two at Grodno. All told, about 4,000
Jews from Ghetto One were sent to Kielbasin in two transports. Later
on they were deported from Kielbasin to Auschwitz and Treblinka. In
January and February 1943, most of those who remained in Ghetto One
were deported directly to Auschwitz and Treblinka, and the few
remaining Jews in Ghetto One were transferred to the Bialystok
ghetto in March 1943.
The first
Aktion in Ghetto One (the third in Grodno) took place in late
November 1942. In the dead of night, men, women, and children were
removed from their apartments and concentrated in the Great
Synagogue. Toward morning Wiese and Streblow arrived, ordered the
Jews out of the synagogue, and began to march them to Kielbasin, all
the while beating them. At the front of the column marched a
respected Jew, Skibelski. The Germans forced him to wear a clown's
hat, dance and play the fiddle. He led the march, while everyone
else was made to sing, in Yiddish, Yiddl Mit'n Fiddl.( Zandman, op.
cit., pp. 70-71)
In the
transport that arrived in Kielbasin at the beginning of December
1942, were also the head of the Jewish Police, Aharon Rubinczik, and
the lawyer and Judenrat member Izaak Gozhanski.
The
deportation lists were prepared by the Judenrat, and the Jewish
Police had to round up the deportees. By mistake, some of those from
the workshops were also added to the list, but they were released at
the intervention of the Jewish liaison representatives and were sent
back to Grodno.
The
Kielbasin Camp
Kielbasin,
formerly the farm of a Polish squire, lay 5 kilometers from Grodno,
on the road to Kuznica. In the 1930s the farm had been used to train
members of He-Halutz ha-Mizrachi prior to their settling in
Palestine, but the Soviet authorities expropriated the farm and made
it a station for agricultural machinery. The Germans converted it
into a prison camp. The camp was 1 square kilometer, and it was
surrounded by a double barbed-wire fence, with a guard tower at
every corner. By the autumn of 1942, there were no more prisoners in
the camp. It then became a concentration camp for Jews from Grodno
and from the surrounding towns - Druskieniki, Skidel, Porzecze,
Jeziory, Sopockinie, Lunna, Ostryna, Brzostowica Wielka, Dombrowa,
Janow, Nowy Dwor, Suchowola, Sokolka, Amdur, Kuznica, Korycin,
Krynki, Sidra, and Odelsk. Based on the number of Jews who were in
the ghettos until the deportation, we may estimate the number of
deportees to Kielbasin as at least 35,000. The number of inmates in
the camp fluctuated because of the transports to the death camps and
because the transfer of Jews from Grodno to Kielbasin was carried
out in groups and over a period of months.
When a new
batch of inmates arrived at the camp, the German police would stage
a scene of chaos and in the disorder would beat and rob the women.
The men were also beaten with particular savagery, and the horses
were flogged until they galloped away with the carts carrying the
Jews' bundles, most of which they had not managed to unload.
Survivors
of the camp remember its commandant, a Rumanian-born German named
Karl Rinzler who could speak Yiddish mixed with German, for his
extraordinary brutality. Almost always inebriated, he would take
inmates from their huts and shoot them publicly for his amusement.
When Rinzler made an appearance in the camp, the Jews tried to stay
in their barracks so as not to be seen outside. In the morning, upon
entering the camp, he called over every Jew he encountered (women
especially) and beat them with a heavy rubber club that had a small
metal ball attached to its end until it was drenched in blood. He
stalked the camp like a wild animal. His brutality took different
forms. Thus he could kill someone in the kitchen for not working, or
savagely beat a Jew who did not remove his hat properly out of
respect.
Twice a
day, in the morning and early afternoon, the Jews had to line up to
be counted. If the count went awry or a search had to be made for
missing people, they might stand outside for hours. Following this,
Rinzler made the inmates run for an hour on the parade ground while
they sang in Yiddish. On one such occasion a youngster aged about
eighteen arrived late; Rinzler stood him in the center of the
grounds and in front of everyone shot him in the head.
The Germans
set up a Judenrat in Kielbasin made up of represen tatives of
the communities' Judenrats. Its chairman, Leib Fraenkel from
Druskieniki, was the liaison with the camp commandant. His deputy
was Marik from Nowy Dwor, and other members were Meir Kaplan from
Krynki, the lawyer Friedberg from Sokolka, the teacher Guttman from
Indura, and Berl Grawinski from Dombrowa. Their tasks included
preparing a card-file of all the Jews in the camp, distributing food
to the inmates, and organizing the transports. Every day the members
of the Judenrat had to appear before Rinzler, who usually flogged
them. There was also a Jewish Police in the camp, which was
entrusted with keeping order and guarding the foodstuffs. The Jewish
policemen had no police powers.
The
Kielbasin inmates lived in a sort of baracks, Ziemlankas, as the
camp's inhabitants called them, 50 to 100 meters long, 6 to 8 meters
wide, and about 2 meters high (the floor was half a meter deep under
the ground). They were the products of the prisoners' labor during
the camp's previous incarnation. There were six blocs of these
barracks, which were separated from one another by barbed-wire
fences. A bloc consisted of fourteen barracks, each of which held at
least 250 or 300 inmates (about 500, according to Errelis). These
barracks were populated by towns: each town was allotted one or more
barracks on the basis of its Jewish population.
The floor
in these Ziemlankas was plain earth padded at the bottom with
branches and covered with straw. On entering one had to step down
five or six steps. Inside there were double shelves/bunks which
served for sleeping. Those in the bottom row could sit but not stand
up. Those on top had the roof immediately above them and had to
crawl in order to lie down. The boards were dirty, and water leaked
in from the roof. Men, women, and children lived together in each
Ziemlanka, and also shared the toilet - an open pit, for men and
women together. The overcrowding, the bitter cold, the rain that
leaked in, and the filth and lice turned these accommodations into a
living hell. The camp had running water, but Jews were forbidden to
go near the taps. It was not uncommon for inmates to be flogged to
death for stealing water.
Hunger was
a permanent fixture at Kielbasin. Food rations consisted of soup
with a few unpeeled potatoes or scraps of rotten cauliflower cooked
in water and 100 to 150 grams of bread per person - though even that
miserly bread portion was not distributed every day. Two weeks after
the camp was opened, the Jewish representation asked the Grodno
ghetto for assistance, and the Judenrat there responded by sending
about 200 grams of bread per person every day. Some fortunate
inmates received packages from Grodno, and some were able to pay
Jewish wagoners from Grodno in dollars for bread. Others brought
with them dried foods such as legumes, beans, lentils, and cereals,
and cooked them in the Ziemlanka over a fire they made with planks
stripped from the walls. But if caught, they were punished; they
were beaten and deprived of their bread ration.
The hunger,
overcrowding, dirt, and lice resulted in lethal epidemics that
claimed many victims - seventy a day, on the average. The ill were
transferred to separate Ziemlankas and treated by Jewish physicians
and nurses who were also incarcerated at Kielbasin. The Germans kept
their distance from the makeshift hospital for fear of becoming
infected.
However,
neither the high mortality rate nor the transports to Treblinka and
Auschwitz emptied out Kielbasin camp, as it was replenished with the
transport from Grodno. But Kielbasin was only a transit camp. A week
after the first Jews were incarcerated there, the transports to
Auschwitz began. The order to begin the transports was issued by the
Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) to Wilhelm Altenloh, who relayed
it, first by telephone and then in writing, to Errelis and to the
Gestapo's external station at Grodno.
To keep the
Judenrat off guard, Rinzler informed the representatives that
because of the cold winter weather and the high incidence of
illness, the Jewish inmates would be moved to another location where
they would work and enjoy better conditions. The Jews of Skidel, who
were the first to arrive at Kielbasin, were also the first to be
transported. A few days after their departure, Rinzler showed the
remaining inmates letters from the deportees in which they described
their fine new conditions. Together with the letters each inmate
received 50 grams of sausage. Many Jews wanted fervently to believe
the Germans, but some were suspicious. As Zalman Gradowski wrote:
"My
friend, we have just had some terrible news. My family and I, my
friends and acquaintances, and thousands more Jews are forced to
prepare to leave. Many horrific thoughts race through my mind. Who
knows where we are being taken, who knows what tomorrow holds for
us? A feeling of dread gives us no respite, because the authorities'
behavior conflicts with their declared goal. If they want us to
serve as a work force, why do they wear us down so harshly, why do
they suck our blood? Why do firm Jewish muscles become flaccid and
turn into feeble hands? Why do they eliminate vital places of work,
which without us remain dead, motionless, yet no one cares? Why are
the public works, which even in a place of concentration are
essential and as needed as life - why are they superfluous here,
useless, and dispensable, why? Or is it really just the deception of
trained, despicable criminals who intend to anesthetize us with the
chloroform of work in order to facilitate the great annihilation?
These reflections obsess me now, before the Jews embark on their
journey."( Zalman Gradowski, Reshimot [Auschwitz 1943/44], in:
Ber Mark, The Auschwitz Megillah (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1978, p. 187.)
Before each
transport the Jews were ordered to turn over all their remaining
money, gold, and jewelry. The transports took place in the dead of
night, and were not postponed by storms or bitter cold. The police
and personnel of Sipo and the SD read out the names of the towns;
their former inhabitants were then concentrated in the center of the
camp and made to march to the train station at Lososna. The elderly
and infirm who were unable to keep up with the march were shot on
the spot. At the station the Jews were packed into freight cars for
their final journey.
In December
1942, a severe shortage of railway cars forced the Germans to
suspend temporarily transports to Auschwitz from the Bialystok
district ghettos and from Kielbasin. Instead, however, they stepped
up the transports to Treblinka, which was relatively close.
Attempts at
Flight and Revolt in Kielbasin and on the Transports. A few dozen
Kielbasin inmates managed to escape, usually in food wagons that
came and went from the camp (among them Felix Zandman), or in wagons
that took the remnants of the Jews' belongings to Grodno. During one
such escape attempt sixteen-year-old Rivka Freydovicz was shot in
the head by Rinzler in front of a group of people, because she tried
to take the place of someone else who was on the list to return to
Grodno.( Zandman, op. cit., pp. 66-67) Others tried to evade the
transports by hiding in abandoned Ziemlankas. Some were discovered
and shot immediately. About 600 Grodno Jews hid in bunks that housed
inhabitants of other towns that had not yet been designated for
transport.
On one of
the transports, in December 1942, from Kielbasin to Auschwitz, an
uprising broke out. The train arrived at Treblinka in the evening,
when most of the Jewish inmates were already locked in their
quarters, and the Germans and Ukrainians had to handle the victims
themselves. One testimony describes what then transpired:
"Suddenly
we heard shouts and shooting... We waited impatiently for morning to
find out what had happened... [and the following day] the field was
strewn with dead bodies and next to them the instruments with which
they had defended themselves.. It emerged that most of the Jews on
the transport, which included children, women, and young people, had
obeyed the order to undress and enter the showers (gas chambers);
but those who came out of the cars last understood the situation.
The redness of the conflagration, the barbed-wire fences, the guard
towers - everything that could be seen in darkness illuminated by
flames - provoked them to rebel. Instead of stripping they stormed
the SS men with almost their bare hands: It was a furious battle.
The Jews defended themselves with the strength of despair. Lacking
weapons, they attacked the Germans with bottles. Some of the young
people fled in all directions inside the camp, and some actually
reached the quarters of the Jewish inmates, where they tried to
hide. However, Germans, Ukrainians, and Kapo personnel rooted them
out brutally, also beating and flogging the veteran prisoners. About
twenty of the youngsters were caught and shot. The others were found
in various places in the camp; those who resisted were shot on the
spot and the others were dragged to the gas chambers. By dawn it was
all over. Three SS men who were critically injured were taken to a
nearby hospital."( Yankel Wiernik, A Year In Treblinka, New
York, 1944, p. 30)
The
uprising was spontaneous, since conditions at Kielbasin ruled out
any ability to organize. Some of the young people on the transport
had taken with them tools and knives for later use in the hope that
they would be able to leap out of the train (as some of their
comrades from Grodno would do in early 1943), and these served them
as weapons.
The
Liquidation of the Kielbasin Camp and the Return of the Survivors to
Grodno. Toward the end of December 1942, when the transports from
Kielbasin were suspended completely due to the shortage of train
cars, the Germans decided to liquidate the camp. The last of the
Jews there, 2,000-3,000, from Druskieniki, Suchowola, and Grodno (as
well as those who had avoided the earlier transports by hiding) were
made to walk back to Ghetto One in Grodno. Again a Jew playing a
fiddle was placed at the head of the column, and the others were
forced to sing as they marched. Only the elderly and the ill were
carried in carts. When they arrived - frozen, bruised, and bloodied
- at the Grodno ghetto, the returnees received assistance from the
Judenrat and were put up temporarily in the Great Synagogue until
places for them could be found in private homes.
Deportation
to the Death Camps
The January
Deportation from Grodno (Aktion of the Ten Thousand). The respite in
the deportations from the Bialystok district lasted about a month,
from mid-December 1942 until mid-January 1943, but even then the
Germans made plans to resume the implementation of the Final
Solution in the region.
On December
16, 1942, Gestapo Chief Mueller sent a cable to the head of the SS,
Himmler, describing the program to renew the deportations to
Auschwitz beginning on January 11, 1943. Among the 45,000 Jews who
were designated for deportation in this wave were 30,000 from the
Bialystok area, 10,000 from Theresienstadt, 3,000 from Holland, and
2,000 from Berlin. Of them, 15,000 of the most fit were to be
selected for forced labor in Auschwitz; all the rest would be
murdered.
The 30,000
from the Bialystok district who were mentioned in Mueller's cable -
which really amounted to an order for the general evacuation of the
Jews from the Greater Reich - were the last in the area. Beside the
city of Bialystok itself, they were from Grodno, Sokolka, Krynki,
Pruzhana, and Jashiniowka.
On January
18, 1943, those designated for deportation received an official
notice stating that they were being sent to forced labor in armament
factories. That evening the ghetto's gates were sealed for five days
(until January 22), and the Jews were not allowed out. The manhunt
began. More than 10,000 people were rounded up and herded into the
Great Synagogue. The Jewish police, under Gestapo supervision,
removed people from their homes and searched out those Jews who had
gone into hiding.
The German
factories outside the ghetto were ordered to send their Jewish
workers back to the ghetto immediately. Some factory managers and
German officials both in the ghetto and outside tried to stand up
for their Jewish workers, or at least for the essential workers
among them, but to no avail. There was no certificate that could
protect its holder; everything was sudden and arbitrary.
The Gestapo
intervened in the work of the Judenrat and introduced changes in its
structure, reducing the number of council officials, and appointing
new ones as it saw fit. Only 2,700 people - the members of the
Judenrat, the Jewish Police, hospital staff, workers in the felt
factory, and craftsmen who produced goods for the Germans - were
separated from the other ghetto inhabitants and permitted to remain
in Grodno.
Many Jews
went into hiding. This caused a discrepancy of 1,500 people, and so
others were seized arbitrarily in order to fill the deportation
quota. The police, fearing that the Germans would make good on their
threat to place them on the transport in order to meet the quota,
redoubled their efforts. Indeed, the last transport was 400 people
above the quota, but the extra Jews were also taken to the death
train with the rest. (In contrast to this harsh description, there
are also testimonies about police who saved relatives and
acquaintances and some who refused to act as informers.)
The
deportees were marched to the train station at Lososna; only the
elderly, the sick, and the children were transported there by wagon
or truck. Guards were present in large numbers, shooting those who
could not keep up. At the train station the deportees were shoved
and pushed on top of each other into cattle cars; the doors were
closed and sealed; and they set off on their final journey.
During the
January Aktion there were two attempts at resistance. Two young Jews
tried to assassinate Streblow but were themselves shot to death (for
details, see the chapter on the youth movements' underground). And
youth-movement members tried to stir up a melee in the synagogue so
to enable a mass escape - but only a few managed to get away.
After the
Aktion, a large number of bullet-ridden dead bodies remained strewn
around the Great Synagogue, as well as in houses and on the streets.
For a full week bodies lay in public places in the ghetto, until the
Germans allowed them to be buried.
During the
January 1943 Aktion, 11,650 Jews were deported from Grodno to
Auschwitz. Of them, 9,851 were murdered as soon as they arrived at
the extermination camp, while 1,799 (1,096 men and 703 women) were
selected for forced labor.( Czech, op. cit.)
|
Date
of transport's arrival
|
Number
of deportees
|
Those
selected for work
|
|
January
20, 1943
|
2,000
|
256
(155 men, 101 women)
|
|
January
21, 1943
|
2,000
|
297
(175 men, 122 women)
|
|
January
22, 1943
|
3,650
|
594
(365 men, 229 women)
|
|
January
23, 1943
|
2,000
|
426
(235 men, 191 women)
|
|
January
24, 1943
|
2,000
|
226
(166 men, 60 women)
|
|
Total
|
11,650
|
1,799
(1096 men, 703 women)
|
The
February Aktion (The 5,000 Aktion) and the Murder of Dr. Brawer.
Following the Aktion of the Ten Thousand, approximately 5,000 Jews
remained in the ghetto, about half of them illegals without papers.
The Germans
expropriated entire streets from the ghetto for the benefit of
Grodno. At the same time, the authorities improved the food supply,
increasing the daily ration per person to between 400 and 600 grams
of bread and adding items that had previously not been available or
had been distributed in minuscule amounts, such as sausage and
cigarettes. The level of the meals in the Judenrat-run kitchen
improved. More important, the Germans assured the Judenrat that
there would be no further deportations. The workers resumed their
work in the ghetto and outside, the scrutiny at the gate stopped,
and something of a calm atmosphere prevailed. True, Wiese continued
to enter the ghetto and shoot people for his amusement; but the
illusion of stability and the difficulty of finding a place to hide
outside the ghetto combined to dissuade many from trying to escape.
Indeed, some of those who had fled now returned.
However,
the ostensible calm did not last for long. On February 11, 1943, the
Judenrat announced that the Jews were being sent to new places of
work. Two days later, on February 13, a few hundred Jews were taken
to work outside the ghetto, mainly in the Gestapo headquarters and
the Royal Hotel. A few hours after their departure, the ghetto was
closed and a new Aktion for deportation started. Wiese, Streblow,
and their henchmen appeared at the ghetto gates, where hundreds of
Jews were assembled in the hope that they would be taken to work,
and began shooting into the crowd. The Jews were then made to line
up in formations of five and were marched to the synagogue. Some
managed to flee, others were shot in the attempt. In the early
afternoon the outside workers were also brought back to the ghetto.
Most of them were taken to the synagogue and later deported; the
rest were left in the ghetto as specialists and brought to the
Judenrat building, which served as a haven for essential workers and
for Jewish policemen and their families. Another safe place was the
felt factory, where the workers were joined by their colleagues from
the starch factory. The wives of the outside workers, believing that
their husbands' work assignments would protect them, did not try to
hide and were seized together with their children. The hospital's
medical staff was also brought to the synagogue in the evening; some
personnel were later taken back to the hospital, the rest became
part of the transport.
The members
of the Judenrat and its clerks, led by Brawer, were also herded into
the synagogue. At around dusk Brawer was called outside, where Wiese
shot him after discovering that Shulkes and Bass, two Farbindungsmen
(liason-men) of the Judenrat, had fled from the ghetto. A third
Farbindungsman, Sarnacki, was also shot for the same reason.
During the
selection of essential workers, Sender Freydovicz tried to move over
from the line of people destined for deportation to the other line,
of those who were supposed to stay. Wiese saw him, told him to turn
around, and lifted his gun in order to execute him. Freydovicz
started running. Even though Wiese was shooting at him with a
machine-gun, he succeeded to escape.( Zandman, op. cit., p. 90)
A few
youngsters again tried to break down the doors and windows in the
synagogue and escape. One of them managed to get outside, but was
seized by a Jewish policeman and brought back in. His friends
removed the door of the lavatory from its hinges and fled. Wiese
opened fire, hitting about ten of them. A few Jews hid inside the
synagogue itself. At 10 P.M. the manhunt was called off, and during
the night the detainees were made to march, in formations of five,
to the Lososna train station. On the way there were more escape
attempts. Some were shot to death, but a few dozen did succeed in
getting away. The transport left Lososna at 5:40 A.M. and reached
Treblinka at ten minutes past noon.
Two days
later the manhunt resumed. The deceptive promises of the Germans
lolled the Jews into a false sense of security and they made no
attempt to hide. This made it very easy for them to be rounded up.
Only the Jews who worked for the Gestapo were permitted to remain in
Grodno; all the others, even the most essential and those who worked
for the Wehrmacht, were added to the transport. A few workers from
the felt factory outside the ghetto managed to escape. This time
those from the hospital staff who had been released only two days
earlier were also put on the transport. All were force-marched to
the train station during the night and were taken to Treblinka.
On the
final day of the Aktion, February 16, 1943, Jewish policemen went
through the streets announcing that anyone caught outside would be
shot, but that no harm would come to those who assembled at the
synagogue. This time, though, skepticism prevailed and no one came
forward. That afternoon the Germans released 200 Jews who were
already massed in the synagogue and declared the Aktion over. Jews
emerged from their hiding places and were greeted by the sight of
bodies in the streets. There was a pool of blood in front of the
synagogue and many bodies inside, as well as piles of blood-drenched
clothing and shreds of torn Torah scrolls. More than 100 Jews were
murdered that day in the ghetto.
In the
February Aktion more than 4,000 Jews were sent to Treblinka in two
transports - 2,500 in the first and 1,600 in the second - of whom
150 were selected for forced labor.
Criticism
of Grodno Survivors Regarding the Behavior of the Judenrat and the
Jewish Police. In the first year of the ghetto's existence, the
Judenrat did its best to assist the inhabitants economically as well
as with housing and health care. Dr. Brawer, the head of the
Judenrat, was known as an educated, decent person and had gained
respect among the Jews as well as the German authorities. By bribing
and cajoling the authorities he succeeded from time to time to
obtain various benefits for the ghetto. However, after the
liquidation of Ghetto Two, in November 1942, Brawer lost his status
with the authorities. When finally Brawer presented himself to the
Germans, they honored him with slaps across his face and by making
him a laughing stock. In December 1942, Errelis ordered him and
other Judenrat members to shovel snow from the street with
teaspoons; on another occasion, he ordered Brawer to put on a black
suit and a top hat and to march atop a barrel filled with excrement.
Many of the
Grodno Jews who arrived in Bialystok in March 1943 accused the
Judenrat of deceiving the public and reducing the Jews' chances of
survival. Others claimed that the Judenrat was not to blame and that
it had no alternative but to urge the Jews to report for the
transports. It is clear, at any rate, that enormous pressure was
brought to bear on the Judenrat when transports were about to be
carried out. The Judenrat was compelled to prepare lists of names,
transfer Jews from one ghetto to another, and declare that the
deportees were, supposedly, being sent to places of work. Some say,
though, that in private talks Judenrat members did not try to calm
anyone; on the contrary, they told the truth. Indeed, the Jews of
Grodno had heard about Auschwitz and Treblinka, and there were
unmistakable signs of the Germans' intention to make Grodno
Judenrein. The Grodno Judenrat, like many others, apparently
subscribed to the theory of survival through work; that is, it tried
to maintain the ghetto's existence until normalcy could be restored,
based on the belief that the Germans would be defeated one day, and
that at least some Jews could be saved - the workers and their
families. Brawer is said to have believed sincerely in the Germans'
promises, at least until the February Aktion. But by then, when he
urged the Jews to act on their own and try to survive, only a few
remained.
Once the
transports began, the Judenrat's activity was almost completely
suspended; the Germans intervened in its every move and replaced
some of its members. In January 1943, the Gestapo demanded the funds
of the Judenrat's finance committee and, shortly afterward, also
confiscated the archives of the statistics' department. The result,
effectively, was the liquidation of the Judenrat together with the
entire ghetto. In the final stage only the liaison personnel to the
Gestapo, the burial society, and the food department were left and
continued to function partially. The Judenrat's presidium and its
large apparatus were voided of content and their tasks were
transferred to others, mainly to the personnel of the Jewish Police.
Following Brawer's murder the Gestapo ordered a new Judenrat to be
established under the leadership of Noah Srebernik, who, after the
dismisal of Rubinczik and his deportation to Kielbasin, was
nominated as chief of the Jewish Police.
Very severe
criticism of the Jewish Police was lodged by the survivors of the
Grodno ghetto for their attempt to save themselves by fulfilling
their duties in a most meticulous manner. Only a few policemen
refrained from collaborating with the Germans, and some of them were
able to save Jews, mainly relatives and acquaintances, during the
January Aktion.
However, by
the time of the February Aktion there was a clear change in the
behavior of the Jewish Police: despite the heavy pressure and the
threats, they refused to inform or to collaborate with the Germans.
Many only went through the motions of doing their duty. Even when
they climbed up into attics looking for Jews they did not carry out
a full-fledged search but made do with calling out the coded
message, Jews must come out of their hiding places because Grodno
shall become Judenrein, so that those in hiding should understand
that they should remain where they were. According to witnesses,
this time the policemen understood that they would not escape the
fate of their brethren and therefore refrained from burdening their
consciences with additional injustices.
"They
grasped that this time the intention was to vacate Grodno finally of
all Jews. The members of the Judenrat were taken, as were the
workers in the felt factory, which was so important to the
Wehrmacht. What, then, assures them that they will be spared? Why
should they again help the enemy in the last extermination
operation? Why should they go on tainting their name?"( The
Tragedy of Grodnoer Jews (Yiddish), March 1943, Yad Vashem Archives,
M-11/30, p. 14)
According
to one testimony, even during the February Aktion some policemen
uncovered hiding places and turned in Jews to the Germans. Some
accepted bribes to hide people and informed on those who could not
pay. Yet such behavior still appears to have been marginal in
February, and perhaps the brutality of the police in the January
Aktion was so overpowering that it overshadowed the changed attitude
of the police in February.
The
Jews' Reaction. What did the ghetto inhabitants know about events
outside Grodno and about the fate of the deportees? Beginning in
late 1941 and during 1942, Grodno was visited by emissaries from
Vilna and by Jews who had witnessed the extermination at Slonim. But
the information they provided reached only limited circles, mainly
the underground groups. In November 1942, the Jews in Grodno did not
yet have a clear picture of the situation, and it was only after the
evacuation of Ghetto Two that rumors about the mass annihilation of
Jews began to trickle in. The information was often conveyed by
Poles who worked with Jews outside the ghetto; but even then only a
few were inclined to believe the rumors. In general, the Jews in
Grodno lacked solid information about the destination of the
transports. The strongest evidence of this was that even during the
liquidation of Ghetto One many still believed that they were being
sent to work, and the postcards that arrived from the deportees
reinforced these illusions.
On the
other hand, many Jews had forebodings and tried to ready themselves
for future developments by preparing hiding places in cellars,
attics, behind double walls, and the like. There were also more
escapes, particularly during and after the February Aktion.
Desperation encouraged boldness, and the threat of being executed no
longer deterred would-be escapees.
A number of
ghetto residents, particularly among the intelligentsia, took their
own lives during the January Aktion. One of these was Arieh Marder,
director of the Judenrat's statistics' department. Two months
earlier he had resigned after learning that the Germans intended to
make use of his data for their extermination operations.
Survivors
of the February Aktion: Legal and Illegal Jews. After the two mass
Aktionen, more than 1,000 Jews still remained in Ghetto One,
concentrated in several buildings between the synagogue and Zamkowa
Street. About half of them were essential workers, the legals, while
the rest were in hiding and so-called illegals. The first group, who
had life certificates, included about 120 hospitalized typhus
victims, twenty-five hospital staff, twenty-five workers in the
Judenrat's kitchen, three directors of Judenrat workshops,
twenty-seven policemen and their families (sixty to seventy people),
and two carpenters who worked for the Gestapo.
There was a
chronic shortage of food in the ghetto; at the same time, anyone
caught smuggling in food faced certain death. A small box of
saccharine cost 33 marks in the Grodno ghetto (7 marks in
Bialystok), a kilogram of butter sold for about 600 marks, and a
kilo of pork went for 400 marks or more. A successful smuggling
transaction conducted outside the ghetto (feigerl) could produce a
large profit of up to 1,000 marks. At these prices there were even
some illegals who risked their lives and stole out of the ghetto
without a yellow patch (a double risk) in order to smuggle goods.
Still, the
amount of food available to the legals, and especially those who
worked for the Gestapo, improved in comparison with the previous
period: they received 1 kilogram of bread per person daily for
themselves and their families, as well as quite a reasonable lunch
from a special kitchen. Gestapo personnel supplied their workers, at
their own initiative, with bread, meat, butter, and the like. At the
same time, the illegals who remained in the shrunken ghetto also
benefited from better living conditons: they lived in houses, could
venture out into the street fairly easily and obtain food, and were
the recipients of food from their legal brethren. The solidarity
that prevailed among the Jews in the Grodno ghetto after the
February Aktion became a byword and was talked about even in
Bialystok.
Those who
were in hiding outside the shrunken ghetto were in a far more
perilous situation. Peasants from the surrounding villages moved
into buildings on streets that had been emptied of Jews and removed
from the ghetto. They could turn in Jews who were in hiding, as the
latter occasionally had to make their way out into the shrunken
ghetto in order to wash and scavenge for food. Few Christians were
willing to risk giving shelter to Jews, and most of the Jews who
escaped were robbed and handed over to the Germans. And yet there
were a few Christians who risked their lives in order to help Jews.
Jews who
tried to escape were shot to death. Wiese usually ordered their
bullet-riddled bodies to be left in public view until dusk as a
warning. Many of those who fled returned to the ghetto when they
were unable to find a place to hide or to join the partisans; yet at
the same time escapes from the ghetto continued.
Transfer
of Grodno's Last Jews to Bialystok. Following the February Aktion,
the last Jews in Grodno sensed that another, final, Aktion was only
a matter of days. One evening a few vehicles entered the ghetto;
these transported the last members of the Judenrat - Feinstein,
Efron, and Lifszic - to Bialystok. Clearly liquidation of the ghetto
was imminent. Dozens of youngsters now tried to reach Bialystok by
every possible means.
On March
11, 1943, tension in the ghetto rose to a fever pitch. The next day
everyone was ordered into the synagogue. This time, though, the Jews
did not believe Wiese's assurances that they were being moved to
Bialystok. Most were certain that their destination was Treblinka.
Nevertheless, they remained quiet and behaved with decorum, taking
care not to anger Wiese. However, before the transport left, Wiese
shot about thirty patients who remained in the hospital. With no one
to bury them, their bodies were thrown into a pit, which was then
filled in with earth by the use of grenades. Then the assembled
Jews, 1,148 people, were force-marched from the synagogue to the
train station and crammed into freight cars, about 110 to each car.
A few youngsters tried to jump out, but with little success.
About half
of those in the transport were legals - ghetto policemen, hospital
staff, craftsmen who worked for the Gestapo - and their families.
They were joined by many illegals, but some of the latter remained
in hiding, either because they were suspicious about the destination
of this transport or because they were unaware of it.
When the
train arrived at Bialystok, the railway cars were opened. The Jews
had to form in threes and were marched to the ghetto; only now did
they believe that their destination was the Bialystok ghetto and not
an extermination camp.
Immediately
upon their arrival, the Grodno deportees were taken to register at
the police station and were deloused, because without the
confirmation of the bath house no one will receive a permit for an
apartment and for supplies. Most of the new arrivals, and
particularly the illegals, had absolutely nothing, and the Bialystok
Judenrat helped them obtain clothing and basic furniture.
It was said
that the Grodno policemen had the effrontery to demand that they be
co-opted to the local police force and that the Grodno functionaries
wanted autonomy - their own Judenrat or representation on the local
Judenrat, accommodations together in the ghetto, and their own
police unit. However, the Bialystok Jundenrat strongly rejected all
these demands. Work was arranged for some of the Grodno Jews in
Bialystok, in some cases for the Gestapo; the Gestapo sent twelve of
them to work outside the ghetto, to which they were returned at the
end of the week. Gestapo workers received good lunches, could
purchase expensive food, and benefited from other privileges. For
example, they were permitted to wander about outside the ghetto and
purchase various items there.
The Grodno
Jews shared the life and the fate of their brethren in the Bialystok
ghetto. Some of them joined the Bialystok underground and took part
in the insurrection of August 1943. Almost none survived.
The Grodno
evacuees took only small bundles with them: a little food, clothing,
and underclothing. Most of their property - furniture, clothing,
dishes, cutlery, and valuables - remained in their homes, and the
authorities sold it for next to nothing. In short order the Jews'
homes were emptied. Only a small part of the former ghetto was
populated by peasants. This then was the demise of the Jewish
community of Grodno.
On March
13, 1943, posters were put up on the city's streets announcing that
Grodno was Judenrein.
Youth
Movements and Underground Activities
The youth
movements were the moving force of the armed struggle during the
Holocaust. Their activity can be divided into two stages: the ghetto
period until the beginning of the liquidation, and the period of the
transports. Of course, under Nazi rule the movements acted as
undergrounds.
In the
first stage they concentrated on spiritual survival and on coping
with the vicissitudes of their situation. The emphasis was on
organizational activity, even including regional conferences and
seminars to discuss the movements' operations (such as the meeting
held in Bialystok in 1942), organizing mutual assistance for the
members and their families, and, above all, educational activity.
There were no schools in the ghetto, and, although former Tarbut
teachers operated illegally to hold some school-courses in private
homes, this was far from filling the void. In order to keep the
youngsters from roaming the streets and perhaps becoming caught up
in unsavory activities, the movements trained group leaders, set up
new groups, and generally filled the educational vacuum left by the
Judenrat and the other adult organizations.
Members of
Ha-Shomer ha-Za'ir established at least four groups of twenty-five
to thirty children aged ten to twelve in the city's two ghettos,
trained group leaders, and organized two or three meetings a week.
In the absence of a permanent site, activities were held at
makeshift locations - in the synagogue, or in the home of a member
whose parents were at work. In Ghetto One there were gardens, so it
was easier to find a corner to meet there. The meetings, which were
conducted in Yiddish, included discussions and stories about Eretz
Israel, Jewish holidays, and other topics. In addition to their
regular activities, the movements also assisted families of members
that found themselves in acute distress. Chajka Grosman relates:
"Eliahu
Tankus would smuggle flour, carry it on his back, enlist his father
in the work of baking, while the Bitsaron smallfry - Dudik, Lonchik,
and others - would distribute the bread to the homes of members and
to the needy."( Chajka Grosman, The Underground People
(Hebrew), Merhaviah, 1950, pp. 203-204.)
The Grodno
branch of Dror-He-Halutz ha-Za'ir had eighty members. They
established a small kibbutz, lived cooperatively, and, together with
members of Ha-Shomer ha-Za'ir, tended part of the Judenrat's
vegetable garden. A month-long seminar of He-Halutz ha-Za'ir took
place in the kibbutz's apartment.
In the
second stage, as the transports began in the winter of 1942/43, the
youth movements were among the first in the ghetto to abandon their
illusions about the Jews' chances of survival. They mobilized for
vigorous underground activity and urged all the Jews to join the
struggle. In fact, the revolution in the goals and methods of the
youth movements had occurred even earlier, when the news was
received of the mass murders in Lithuania and Byelorussia. The
emphasis shifted from indoctrination and education to armed revolt.
The youth movements tried to convince the public that the Nazis'
actions in Vilna were not the exception and were not limited in
scope, but were one link in a chain of mass annihilation that would
inevitably encompass also the Jews of Grodno and its surroundings.
Grodno was
situated on a crossroads and was an important connecting station in
the Vilna-Bialystok-Warsaw triangle. To the youth movements, these
cities and their districts constituted a single organic unit, but
under the Germans' administrative division they were located in
three different government areas. Warsaw was part of the
Generalgouvernement; Vilna, of the Reichskommissariat Ostland; and
Bialystok and its district belonged to East Prussia. A special
permit was required to move from one region to another, and
inspectors carried out frequent rigorous checks of passengers on the
trains. Nevertheless, the youth movements maintained constant
contact among the ghettos in Vilna, Bialystok, and Warsaw, and the
Grodno ghetto, by means of emissaries and go-betweens. The
messengers that were chosen usually had an Aryan appearance and
spoke fluent Polish; they were also supplied with the appropriate
personal papers. In time the emissaries became intermediaries who
transferred information, situation appraisals, and carried letters.
The closest ties were between the ghettos of Grodno and Bialystok,
and between them and the smaller ghettos in the region.
The first
contact between the Grodno ghetto and Vilna was effected through
Bella Chazan (later Ya'ari), a native of Volhynia and an activist in
Dror-He-Halutz (she was caught and sent to Auschwitz in April 1942,
survived, and settled in Israel after the war). In October 1941,
Bella Chazan was sent to Grodno, arriving a few days before the
city's Jews were incarcerated in the ghettos. She found living
quarters at the edge of the city, obtained work as an interpreter
for the Gestapo, and was issued authentic Aryan papers under an
assumed identity. Her apartment was a transit and meeting place for
the intermediaries of the pioneer youth movements on the
Vilna-Warsaw route. She herself maintained contact with the ghetto
through her friend Itka Burakov, and the two established a group of
He-Halutz ha-Za'ir in the ghetto. Her mission was to serve as a
liaison between the center in Vilna and the branches in Lida,
Grodno, and Bialystok, to smuggle information, money, and arms, and
to prepare safe houses in Grodno for other movement intermediaries.
Using
various pretexts, Bella Chazan succeeded in leaving Grodno and
returning on a number of occasions. Toward the end of 1941, she
visited Vilna and discovered that the city's Jews were being
massacred at Ponar. Back in Grodno, she told the heads of the
Judenrat what she had learned and asked them for financial
assistance in order to smuggle Jews out of Vilna. To her comrades in
the Dror movement she conveyed instructions to organize as an
underground. However, as she later related, her story was not
believed in Grodno:
"Some
members of the Judenrat disowned responsibility: What does she want,
this youngster, where will we put more people? The head of the
[Jewish] Council, Dr. David Brawer, said that they couldn't just
give money for no good reason to a pisherkeh like me."( Bella
Ya'ari-Chazan, They Called Me Bronislawa (Hebrew), Bet Lohamei
ha-Getta'ot, 1991, pp. 50-51)
Bella
Chazan stood in the corridor and burst into tears, but then Dr. Zvi
Bielko, a Judenrat member, came up to her and said he would do
everything in his power to assist the refugees who reached Grodno.
Good to his
word, he gave Bella money and false papers for Vilna Jews. At a
meeting with members of the movement's local branch, Bella Chazan
described the mass murders in Vilna and spoke about the need to
organize all the young people in a revolt.
A few days
before Christmas 1941, two emissaries from Warsaw arrived in Bella
Chazan's apartment in Vilna - Lonka Koziebrodska and Tamara (Tema)
Sznaiderman (Mordecai Tenenbaum's girl-friend), who had been sent
from Warsaw to Vilna. From Tamara Bella heard about groups that had
already been smuggled out of Vilna to Bialystok and about an
expected visit by Mordecai Tenenbaum in Grodno on his way from
Warsaw to Bialystok. Tamara returned to Warsaw, where she made known
events in the areas annexed to East Prussia (the Bialystok
district). At the same time, Mordecai Tenenbaum and Bella Chazan
reached Grodno and stole into the ghetto.
"We
hurried to meet with the Judenrat. Mordecai admonished them in no
uncertain terms that they had to prepare for a revolt. His message
was transmitted from one person to another. The members of the
Zionist movement began to grasp the need to make preparations for an
uprising, but the majority of the Jewish public believed that as
long as they would supply the Germans' need for cheap labor, [the
Germans] would have no reason to exterminate them. Even those who
believed the stories about the massacre of the Vilna Jews at Ponar
preferred to view it as an exceptional case."( Ibid., p. 54.)
Tenenbaum
sent Bella Chazan back to Vilna, while he himself visited Bialystok
in early 1942, as an emissary of Dror-He-Halutz. Tenenbaum's visit
to Grodno revitalized the city's youth. Bronia Winitzki-Klibanski, a
Dror activist in Grodno, relates: "We were captivated by his
personality, his courage, and his words, which already then
emphasized the demand for resistance and struggle."( Bronia
Klibanski, My Memories of Mordecai Tenenbaum and the Work of the
Bialystok Underground, Yalkut Moreshet (Hebrew), IX (Tishrei 1929),
p. 58. )
Zippora
Birman, a Dror activist from Bialystok, came later to Grodno to
replace Hershl Rozental, who was put in charge of connections with
the partisans in the forest.
In the
middle of 1942, Ha-Shomer ha-Za'ir and Dror united for a joint
struggle. Each movement continued to pursue its own way of life and
its own social existence within the framework of the kibbutzim, but
they shared a common goal: to secure arms and do battle in the
ghetto. The united underground group numbered about 100 people.
Attempts to co-opt other movements - the Communists, the few
Bundists who were left, and the Revisionists - were unsuccessful.
The Communists were not an organized, cohesive force, and their
members operated as individuals; the Revisionists promised to make
contact with the underground but finally acted on their own. In the
meantime, there were no means to purchase arms and Zerah Zilberberg
asked the Judenrat for financial assistance. Zilberberg's efforts to
forge ties with the Aryan side also led nowhere.
Most of the
underground members advocated an armed struggle inside the ghetto,
but some urged flight into the forests. A mixed group of five made
its way out of the ghetto in an attempt to make contact with
partisans, but four were killed by the Germans; only Leiser Rejzner
got back to the ghetto. The hopes they had had of going into the
forests had to be dropped for the time being, especially when they
discovered that a sine qua non for joining the partisans was the
possession of weapons. Some suggested that the members of the
movements go to Bialystok, but the decision of the majority was to
remain in Grodno and do their best to organize resistance. In the
words of Zippora Birman:
"The
failure of the forest [idea] shattered us all. We were left with no
option. We had no choice but to die honorably where we were. We
began to prepare a counter-action. Not everyone agreed with this. A
counter-action would mean [our] total liquidation within a few days.
We thought that, despite everything, a few thousand would survive in
this way. The community seeks options, nobody wants to die. In the
face of death, the life instinct is heightened. We decide: the girls
will break into Bialystok, and the boys will remain in order to
implement the counter-action."( Zippora Birman, To My Dear
Comrades Wherever You Are, in: Bronia Klibanski, The Underground
Archives of the Bialystok Ghetto, Yad Vashem Studies, vol. II
(1958), pp. 304-324.)
Betar
activists also tried to develop underground activity in Grodno, but,
as we have said above, did not join Ha-Shomer ha-Za'ir and Dror;
their operations were limited. In December 19 |
