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PIUS XI I

Eugenio Pacelli, 1876-1958), pope (1939-1958). Born in Rome, Pacelli studied philosophy at the Gregorian University and theology at Sant' Apollinare, both in Rome. After his ordination in 1899 he entered the Secretariat of State in 1901 and began a long career in papal diplomacy. He became assistant secretary of state in 1911, pro-secretary of state in 1912, and secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs in 1914.

On May 13, 1917, Pacelli was consecrated titular archbishop of Sardes and appointed nuncio to Bavaria. He became nuncio to Germany in June 1920 and signed the concordats with Bavaria in 1924 and Prussia in 1929. Pacelli was made a cardinal in 1929, and a year later he was appointed secretary of state. He concluded the concordat with Baden in 1932. From the time of Adolf Hitler's accession to power (January 30, 1933), the acts of Cardinal Pacelli have been a matter of controversy.

According to official Catholic sources, Pacelli did not in any way influence the German bishops who, on March 28, 1933, lifted previous prohibitions against the Nazi party so that any Catholic could now "be loyal to the lawful authorities."

On April 10 of that year, Franz von Papen and Hermann Goring were received by Pope Pius XI, who, according to von Papen, "remarked how pleased he was that the German government now had at its head a man uncompromisingly opposed to communism and Russian nihilism in all its forms." The strong anticommunism of the Holy See played a major role in the stand of Pacelli. On July 20, a concordat was signed at the Vatican by Pacelli and von Papen that represented a great diplomatic victory for Hitler.

Hitler, however, never intended to implement the concordat. With religious liberty at stake, Pope Pius XI on March 21, 1937, issued the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge (With Burning Concern), in which he questioned the errors of Nazi ideology: "Whoever detaches the race, the nation, the state, the form of government ... from the earthly frame of reference and makes them into the highest norm of all, higher than religious values, and worships them with idolatry, perverts and distorts the order of things provided and commended by God." The encyclical condemned neo-pagan theories such as the "idolatric doctrine of the race," but not the constitutional form of the Nazi regime.

Cardinal Pacelli was elected pope on March 2, 1939, and took the name Pius XII. Regarding his attitude to Jews, his pontificate is the subject of disagreement among scholars, some praising his aid to individual Jews in distress, others criticizing his silence and his failure to publicly condemn the Nazi persecutions. Even Catholic authors who base themselves only on the official documents published by the Holy See have deplored some aspects of the conduct of the papacy in general and of Pius XII in particular.

From the very beginning of the Nazi regime, the church tried to alleviate the fate of Jews who had converted to Catholicism. This is illustrated by the remonstration of the Holy See against those aspects of the Italian racial laws of 1938 that dealt with mixed marriages and the children of such marriages. As a general rule it can be said that the Holy See relied exclusively on diplomacy, while human suffering and moral principles were ignored.

Nevertheless, when it became urgent to find a haven for thousands of Jewish refugees after the Kristallnacht pogrom, the Holy See intervened in March 1939, in Catholic Brazil. It obtained 3,000 visas for baptized Jews, of which 2,000, however, were not granted because of alleged "improper conduct," in Cardinal Luigi Maglione's words. This was probably a reference to the returning of Jews to Judaism once they reached Brazil. Some historians believe that in its policies toward refugees, the church manifested antisemitism, indifference to the plight of the non-Christian Jews, and excessive neutralism.

In the spring of 1940, the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Isaac Herzog, asked the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Maglione, to intervene in Spain to keep Jews there from being sent back to Germany, and he later wrote again about a similar situation in Lithuania. But the Holy See did not intervene.

Some historians claim that the pope had only partial knowledge of the Nazi program of extermination of the Jews, but this seems not to have been the fact. The papal Secretariat of State was among the first bodies in the world to receive information about the massacre of the Jews. At the beginning of 1941, Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna told Pius XII about the deportation of Jews that was taking place. The charge d'affaires in Slovakia, Giuseppe Burzio, as early as October 27, 1941, sent a report to his superiors at the Holy See in Rome, according to which Jews were being systematically destroyed. On March 9, 1942, Burzio forwarded a telegram and wrote that the deportation of eighty thousand Slovak Jews to Poland was equivalent to sending a large number of them to certain death.

That September, a common diplomatic move was made by the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See. The British government was most anxious to secure a public papal condemnation of the Nazi treatment of inhabitants of occupied territories and of the persecutions of the Jews. Osborne Francis d'Arcy, the British representative, wrote to the secretary of state: "A policy of silence in regard to such offenses against the conscience of the world must necessarily involve a renunciation of moral leadership and a consequent atrophy of the influence and authority of the Vatican."

On September 18, Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI, noted: "The massacres of the Jews reach frightening proportions and forms." But when the United States representative to the Vatican, Myron Taylor, forwarded a note to Cardinal Maglione that month, stating that the Jews were being sent to the east to be killed, the secretary of state replied that it was not possible to verify the accuracy of such rumors.

On October 7, 1942, the chaplain of a hospital train in Poland wrote: "The elimination of the Jews, through mass assassination, is almost total . . . they say that two million Jews have been murdered." That December, prior to Christmas Eve, many telegrams,including one from Chief Rabbi Herzog, brought urgent appeals to the pope to save the Jews of eastern Europe. Pius XII decided to break his reserve, and in his message broadcast by the Vatican radio on December 24, he spoke about the "hundreds of thousands who through no fault of their own, and solely because of their nation or race, have been condemned to death or progressive extinction." The reference to Jews was clear but not explicit. In March 1943, Burzio wrote again: "Jews in Poland are (being] killed by gas or machine guns."

In Slovakia, where a Catholic priest, Monsignor Jozef Tiso, was head of state, "therefore the scandal is greater, and greater the danger that responsibility can be shifted to the Catholic Church itself," according to the historian John Morley (p. 101). Morley comments that the Vatican perhaps did not act because of indifference to the deportation of the Jews, because of German influence, or because it cared only for Catholic interests.

In France, following the German invasion and the establishment of the Vichy government, Marshal Philippe Petain wrote in August 1941 to his ambassador in the Holy See, Leon Berard, asking him to verify whether the Vatican would object to anti-Jewish laws. Berard made an inquiry at the Secretariat of State and answered that even if the church condemned racism, it did not repudiate every measure against Jews. Morley writes that the Vatican's role was ambivalent; there was little opposition to anti-Jewish laws, and only a quiet protest against the deportations of 1942. The papal nuncio in France, Valerio Valeri, considered the reaction of the French bishops to be "a platonic protest." Monsignor Jules-Gerard Saliege, the archbishop of Toulouse, made public a pastoral letter against the persecution of the Jews, but the Holy See itself did not react in France.

In Germany, the Jews could not find a champion who would try to stop the killing through an appeal to the public. The papal nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo, was so weak in his remonstrations to the Nazi government that even the bishop of Berlin, Konrad von Preysing, asked the pope, in January 1943, whether he should be represented at all at the German government. Pius XII apparently wished to avoid the reprisals that might have been provoked by publicly condemning the persecution of the Jews, and he therefore left the responsibility for such decisions to local clergy.

Italy, after the armistice of September 8, 1943, was also occupied by the Nazis. At the end of that month the Nazis demanded 50 kilograms of gold from the Jewish community. The Vatican is said to have offered 15 kilos, but this was not taken up. On October 16 of that year, the Nazis arrested more than a thousand Jews in Rome and sent them to their death in Auschwitz. No intervention stopped the action, taken almost under the papal windows. Baron Ernst von Weizsacker, the German ambassador to the Holy See, sent a report on October 28 to the German Foreign Office in which he wrote:

"Although under pressure from all sides, the pope has not let himself be drawn into any demonstrative censure of the deportation of Jews from Rome. Although he must expect that his attitude will be criticized by our enemies and exploited by the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon countries in their propaganda against Catholicism, he has done everything he could in this delicate matter not to strain relations with the German government and German circles in Rome."

Catholic authors explain that Weizsacker wanted only to avoid Nazi reprisals against the pope. The fact remains, however, that no public protest was made on that occasion. At the same time, in many monasteries, churches, and ecclesiastical buildings in Italy, Jews were saved during the Nazi occupation, and the simultaneous opening of so many Catholic institutions could have taken place only under clear instructions by Pius XII. Moreover, the pope protested officially, if only privately, against the persecution of the Jews in those countries where he felt that he might have some influence.

In Bulgaria, the Holy See was asked to help save 6,000 Jewish children by transferring them to Palestine. On this occasion the secretary of state, Cardinal Maglione, wrote to the apostolic delegate, Amleto Cicognani, in Washington and expressed his reserve concerning Zionism.

Throughout the period of the German occupation of Hungary, which began on March 19, 1944, the papal nuncio in Budapest, Angelo Rotta, as well as the pope himself, took measures to help Hungarian Jews. As early as March 24, Rotta advised the Hungarian government to be moderate in its plans concerning the Jews. When this admonition was not heeded, he continued throughout April to approach the Hungarians about their treatment of the Jews. Speaking in the name of the pope, Rotta protested against the planned deportation of the Jews--as it happened, on the very day that they began (May 15,1944) but again to no avail. On June 25, the pope himself cabled the Hungarian regent, Miklos Horthy, asking him to reverse Hungarian policy on the Jews. The cable read:

"We have been requested from several sides to do everything possible to ensure that the sufferings which have had to be borne for so long by numerous unfortunate people in the bosom of this noble and chivalrous nation because of their nationality or racial origin shall not be prolonged and made worse. Our fatherly heart, in the service of a solicitous charity which embraces all mankind, cannot remain insensitive to these urgent wishes. Therefore I am turning personally to Your Excellency and I appeal to your noble feelings, in full confidence that Your Excellency 
will do everything in your power to spare so many unfortunate people further suffering."

On July 1, the regent replied to the pope's message:

"I received your Holiness's telegraphic message with the deepest understanding and with thankfulness, and I beg you to be convinced that I am doing all in my power to see that the demands of Christian and humane principles are respected. May I be permitted to ask that in the hour of grievous trial Your Holiness may continue to look with favor on the Hungarian people."

Shortly thereafter, on July 7, Horthy ended the first wave of deportations from Hungary. Undoubtedly, the papal protest, along with those of King Gustaf V of Sweden, Anthony Eden, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, contributed to his decision to stop the transports.

After the arrow cross party seized power in Hungary on October 15, Rotta again registered numerous protests on behalf of the Jews. Many of his actions were taken jointly with the representatives of several neutral states. Like them, Rotta issued letters of protection (Schutzpasse) in the name of the Vatican to Jews. These letters helped safeguard some twenty-five hundred Jews from the Arrow Cross reign of terror. All of these acts were significant contributions toward the rescue of the remaining Hungarian Jews.

During the war, criticism was heard from within the Catholic church itself. Cardinal Eugene Tisserant told Cardinal Emmanuel Suhard on June 1, 1940, of his fears that history would prove critical of the Holy See for having adopted an accommodating political line "for its own exclusive advantage." Cardinal August Hlond of Poland reported in August 1941 to the secretary of state that the Polish people believed the Pope had abandoned them. This was said in light of the Nazi persecution of the Polish church and clergy.

The attitude of the pope toward Nazi officials "dramatically changed" after September 1942, when Myron Taylor told him that the Allies were determined to achieve total victory. This would suggest that for Pius XII considerations of Realpolitik were more important than moral principles.

The major question that arises is why Pius XII did not raise his voice in public forcefully against the Nazi cruelty. Here are some possible answers to this question, given by Catholic writers:

  • No successful results could be expected, public condemnation would have had little influence on the Nazi authorities, and it could endanger other activities that were still possibl

  • Speaking publicly would harm the Jews, whom the pope in fact wanted to help;

  • Some of the victims could still be saved, but only through discreet private interventions;

  • A public intervention against the German government could provoke a schism among German Catholics, as well as measures against the Vatican and the head of the church;

  • Pius XII's hope of acting as a mediator in the war was incompatible with the condemnation of any one of the belligerents; he could forfeit any claim to the role of peacemaker if he once modified his position of neutrality;

  • The international character of the Catholic church, its freedom from politics, and its impartiality toward all belligerents;

  • The fear that the Gestapo might seize the pope and the Vatican;

  • The alarm caused by the increasing threat of communism to eastern Europe.

The controversy about Pius XII and the Holocaust is still open. At the end of his visit to Israel in 1964, Pope Paul VI came to Pius's defense in Jerusalem. On March 12, 1979, Pope John Paul II met with Jewish leaders in Rome and said: "I am happy to evoke in your presence today the dedicated and effective work of my predecessor Pius XII on behalf of the Jewish people." In a meeting with American Jewish leaders in September 1987 in Miami, John Paul II again recalled the positive attitude of Pius XII. However, his passivity in the face of the 
Holocaust remains a controversial subject.

 

Author: Sergio I. Minerbi 

The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, New York: Macmillan, 1990, Gutman, Israel (editor in chief)  

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