

The Germans: "An Antisemitic People" The Press Campaign After 9 November 1938 Herbert Obenhaus

The pogrom of 9-10 November 1938 gave rise to a variety of tactical and strategic considerations by the German government and National Socialist party offices. The discussions that took place in the Ministry of Propaganda - which in some respects played a pivotal role in the events, due largely to its minister, Josef Goebbels - were of particular significance. On the one hand, the ministry was obliged to document the "wrath of the people" following the assassination of Ernst vom Rath; on the other hand, it was also responsible for manipulating the population by influencing the press and molding opinion. Concerning the events themselves, the main issue was what kind of picture the press was conveying to both a national and an international readership. In the ministry, this prompted several questions: Could it be satisfied with the reactions of the population to vom Rath's murder? What explanation could be given for the people's obvious distance to the events surrounding 9 November? Should the press make greater efforts to influence the opinions prevalent among the population? Should special strategies for the press be developed and pursued after 9 November 1938? Moreover, since the pogrom proved to be a turning point in the regime's policies towards German Jews and marked the beginning of a qualitative change, how should the press react to these changes ?

Press activity was also conducted on a second level, that of the NSDAP, which had its own press service, the *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz* (NSK).¹ As was the case with Goebbels' ministry, the

¹ It was published in 1938 with the publisher's information, "Commissioned by Wilhelm Weiss responsible for the reports from the Reichspressestelle: Dr. Otto Dietrich, *Reichspressechef* of the NSDAP. The editor-in-chief responsible for the remaining contents was Helmut Suendermann. Deputy editor-in-chief was Wilhelm Ritgen." For more information on the *NSK*, which was established on 14 January 1932 in Munich and published in Berlin after 1 May 1933, see: Peter Stein, "Die NS-Gaupresse 1925-1933. Forschungsbericht - Quellenkritik - neue Bestandsaufnahme," *Dortmunder Beitrage zur Zeitungsforschung*, 42 (1987), pp. 55 ff.

propaganda activity of the party was organized both in party headquarters as well as in local and regional offices, the Gau propaganda offices were for the party what the Reich propaganda offices were for the ministry.² The press activity of the party was closely connected to that of the Ministry of Propaganda, and after 9 November, the party's press service was faced with the same tasks as the ministry. But it remains to be asked whether it pursued its own path, developed its own propagandistic content and offered its own solutions.

In addition to the activity of the ministry and the party, both of which released information to influence the press, the activity of the journalists in the various divisions of the press should also be investigated. One of the particular strengths of the National Socialist news organization was that it could limit itself to general guidelines or to individual specific directives, and was confident that either way the prescribed political line of thought would be adhered to. Yet on occasion, journalists were granted some scope for their own creative activity. If they violated the rules, they were disciplined according to a graduated scale of punishment.³ The National Socialist propagandists could rely on the loyalty of the press. Nevertheless, it remains to be investigated how each of the directives was adhered to, and whether the press independently contributed to the objectives set by the ministry. This cannot be tackled within the scope of the present study; rather, pertinent questions can be addressed by examining the divisions of the press at the

I would like to thank Rebecca L. van Dyck for the translation of my contribution.

² Ernest K. Bramsted, *Goebbels und die nationalsozialistische Propaganda 1925-1945*, Frankfurt am Main, 1971, pp. 167-175, which describes the complicated distribution of tasks and the resultant tension between Goebbels and Dietrich. After 1937, the branches of the Ministry of Propaganda were called *Reichspropagandaaemter*, before that they were called *Landesstellen*.

³ Refer to Kurt Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse 1914-1945. Geschichte der deutschen Presse Teil III. Abhandlungen und Materialien zur Publizistik*, Berlin, 1972, vol. 7, p. 372, according to which a breach of the rules could lead to court proceedings under the *Schriftleitergesetz* (Editor-in-Chief Law), or the *Reichskulturkammergesetz* (Reich Chamber of Culture Law). Compare Norbert Frei and Johannes Schmitz, *Journalismus im Dritten Reich*, 2nd edition, Munich, 1989, pp. 30-35.

local level. In order to accomplish this I have consulted newspapers from the northwestern area of Germany.

II

To begin with, it is necessary to trace the steering activity of the Ministry of Propaganda during the weeks after the pogrom, as well as the intensification of the persecution of Jews.⁴ Within what context and from what perspective did the ministry wish to see the subject of the Jews handled? Further, it must be asked what the intention was of each point discussed. Previous investigations have already shown that the Ministry of Propaganda was aware of the population's detachment from - and even its censure of - the pogrom.⁵ Were the reasons for this detachment analyzed, and what attempts were made to understand the population's reactions? It can be shown that the ministry responded by developing a coordinated political concept and intensifying its antisemitic policy. Constructed by the Ministry of Propaganda, this concept – which will be discussed in detail further on – placed the Jew in the context of German national history, and by the misuse and distorted interpretation of historical facts attempted to prove the validity of antisemitism. The party's press service adopted this concept and consistently pursued it in the subsequent weeks.

At the Reich press conference on 17 November 1938, fundamental directives regarding the journalistic treatment of the "Jewish question" were issued. (This date may have been deliberately chosen, being the day of vom Rath's funeral.) This was preceded by a conference under the chairmanship

⁴ For the steering of the press during the pogrom itself, refer to: Wolfgang Benz, "Der Rueckfall in die Barbarei. Bericht ueber den Pogrom," in: *Der Judenpogrom 1938. Von der "Reichskristallnacht" zum Voelkermord*, Walter H. Pehle, ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1988, pp. 13-51 (specifically pp.15-19). Also Wolfgang Benz, "Der Novemberpogrom 1938," in: *Die Juden in Deutschland 1933-1945. Leben unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft*, 3rd edition, Wolfgang Benz, ed., Munich, 1993, pp. 499-544, and pp. 505-521, a section with the heading "Die Inszenierung des Pogroms und die Regie der oeffentlichen Meinung."

⁵ Juergen Hagemann, *Die Presselenkung im Dritten Reich*, Bonn, 1970, pp.126 f

of Hermann Goering, who had received instructions from Hitler to "uniformly combine" the policies with respect to the German Jews and "to carry them out either way" (*sie so oder so zur Erledigung zu bringen*).⁶ It was at this conference, attended by many people including the two other main protagonists Goebbels and Heydrich, that the strategies were decided upon for the forced emigration of Jews, and the exclusion from German society of those Jews unfit for emigration and their subsequent transportation into a forced community.⁷ It was the responsibility of the Ministry of Propaganda to support and justify these policies both in their execution and in their heightened radicalism and irrevocability.

The chief spokesman of the Ministry of Propaganda was *Ministerialrat* Alfred-Ingemar Berndt, who served as director of the press department;⁸ he was supported by *Oberregierungsraete* Dr. Wilhelm Ziegler⁹ and Hans

⁶ Minutes of a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Aviation on 12 November 1938. *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militaergerichtshof*, 14. November 1945 - 1. Oktober 1946, XXVIII, Nuremberg, 1948, pp. 499-540.

⁷ Two further "strategy conferences" of National Socialist leaders in the subsequent weeks were concerned with the continuation of the policies against German Jews; see Wolf Gruner, "Lesen brauchen sie nicht zu koennen...." Die Denkschrift ueber die Behandlung der Juden in der Reichshauptstadt auf allen Gebieten des xffentlichen Lebens' vom Mai 1938," *Jahrbuch fuer Antisemitismusforschung*, 4 (1995), pp. 305-341 (specifically pp. 306 and 313, including footnote 80). For the individual measures, Joseph Walk, *Das Sonderrecht fuer die Juden im NS-Staat. Eine Sammlung der gesetzlichen Massnahmen und Richtlinien - Inhalt und Bedeutung. Motive - Texte - Materialien*, Karlsruhe, 1981.

⁸ Berndt, born in 1905, was appointed head of the department in April 1936. When it was divided into domestic and foreign departments in April 1938, Berndt headed the domestic department until Hans Fritzsche, born in 1900, became his successor in December 1938; see Koszyk, *Deutsche Presse*, p. 363. Berndt is described as Goebbels' protegé; see Bramsted, *Goebbels*, p. 124.

⁹ Ziegler, born in 1891, frequently wrote articles on contemporary history. From 1919 to 1932 he worked for the *Reichszentrale fuer Heimatdienst* and was a member of the *Deutsche Volkspartei*. Upon joining the Ministry of Propaganda in 1933, he took over the department concerned with the "Execution of a Uniform Reich Propaganda in the Areas of Foreign, Defense and Jewish Policy." According to Kuerschner's German Calender of Literature for 1943, Ziegler was a *Ministerialrat* in the Ministry of Propaganda. In 1941 he was appointed honorary professor for modern - specifically postwar - history in the Department of Foreign Sciences of the University of Berlin. Ziegler was the director of the Institute for the Study of

Fritzsche.¹⁰ Berndt announced that every newspaper must “print a series of articles...within the next ten days” on “the role of the Jews in Germany.” The articles that the Ministry of Propaganda had in mind focused on Jews from the time of Bismarck's Reich until Hitler's take over of the government in 1933. The literary allusions later provided by Ziegler also referred to this period. The period after 1918 was considered particularly important, as “the revolution brought the Jews to the top everywhere ...The Council of the People's Delegates (*Rat der Volksbeauftragten*) consisted solely of Jews, ... until 1933 there were Jews everywhere, only Jews.”¹¹ The “information campaign” of which Berndt spoke was meant to be conducted not only by the press, but also radio and film, and ultimately “in all areas.” Accompanied by the laughter of those present, he announced that dialogues would be aired on radio, for example “between the editors in chief of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Stuermer*.”¹² However, Berndt also coupled his address with the warning that

the Jewish Question run by the Ministry of Propaganda. Helmut Heiber, *Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut fuer Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands*, Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 600 ff.

¹⁰ The spokesmen's expositions have been very well documented. On the one hand, there is the report on the press conference written and signed by Kurt Metger of the German News Office. This report, no. 568/38, written in the form of a letter, was headed “Strictly confidential! For information only! Must remain secret!”: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, ZSg. 110/11/125r. On the other hand, there is the telex sent by the Berlin office of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to the head office in Frankfurt: Ibid., ZSg. 102/13/30v. This topic is again taken up in the press conference of 19 November. A telex was also sent in this regard: ibid., ZSg. 102/13. In the following, I rely in particular on Metger, who wrote coherent reports. The shorter and less precise wording of the telex is only mentioned to supplement the reports. For the records, see *NS-Pressweisungen der Vorkriegszeit. Edition und Dokumentation*, Hans Bohrmann, ed., vol. 1, revised by Gabriele Toepser-Ziegert, Munich, 1984, pp. 53-59. The press directives for 1935, which have not yet been published, go into more detail about Kurt Metger; compare ibid., p. 53, footnote 143. Incidentally, I would like to thank Ms. Toepser-Ziegert for her friendly advice and support. In addition to the press directives from 17 and 19 November extracted from archives, I have also cited press directives from the subsequent weeks as they appear in Hagemann, *Presselenkung*.

¹¹ Telex version.

¹² For details on the special role of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* during the Nazi period see Bramsted, *Goebbels*, pp. 191-213.

over the course of the following few days newspapers would be "very closely observed" with respect to their compliance with the ministry's directives.¹³

One of the key phrases of the information campaign was the "subversive activity" of Jews, of which Ziegler spoke while drawing on antisemitic literature. Subversion had occurred both in the labor movement - he mentioned the names Marx, Engels and Singer - as well as in the liberal movement - he referred to Bamberger and Lasker. In the labor movement, Ziegler said, the Jews were generally responsible for tendencies that were "negative, hostile to the state, oppositional," in liberalism, the Jews represented the "typical enemies of the Reich." And these included of course Jewish bankers - broadly referred to as the "court Jews" (*Hofjuden*) in the Wilhelminian era. The "politics of Judaism" became clearly discernible within the context of the escalating crisis during World War I: the Jews had come out "firstly against a strong national authority, and secondly against the nation's will to resist external forces." This tendency, Ziegler remarked, was even more noticeable during the November Revolution. "The Jews have triumphed all along the line, and now it turns out that Jews are at the top everywhere: ... in the Council of the People's Delegates - Hugo Haase and Otto Landsberg; in Munich - Eisner; in Dresden - Gradnauer, Lipinsky und Fleissner. ... Everywhere radicalism breaks through and triumphs, there are Jews there as supporters of radicalism." Referring each time to antisemitic literature, Ziegler's casting of blame extended also to the Treaty of Versailles and the "epoch of the policy of fulfillment."¹⁴ Further literary references followed, this time pointing to the role of Jews in economics, culture and crime.¹⁵ In his

¹³ It was said that "over the last few days, many tips have been received," of which the newspapers, however, had "not yet used even 5%." It is interesting to note that Berndt's warning was also included in the telex version, which was overall much shorter.

¹⁴ In this regard he referred to one of his own publications: Wilhelm Ziegler, *Versailles, die Geschichte eines missglueckten Friedens*, Hamburg, 1933. The 4th edition was published in 1937.

¹⁵ The "basic" literary source was the book *Die Juden in Deutschland*, edited by the Institut zum Studium der Judenfrage, Munich, 1936. See footnote 9, above, for information on the institute. As a source of information on the role of the Jews in the labor movement, Ziegler mentioned *F[ritz] O[tto] H[ermann] Schulz, Jude und Arbeiter. Ein Abschnitt aus der Tragödie des deutschen Volkes*, edited by the Institut zum Studium der Judenfrage in

crowning conclusion, Ziegler recommended that newspapers look into the role of Jews as assassins. It came as no surprise then that the shots fired by Herschel Grynszpan at vom Rath were denounced shortly after as typically Jewish.

As Berndt had already implied, the information campaign was broadly structured and was meant to encompass all media. It was the main focus of the propaganda activity of the winter.¹⁶ Great importance was attached to antisemitic press activity after 9 November; this is demonstrated also by the status it received in Josef Goebbels' journal. He spoke of "our campaign against the Jews in the press,"¹⁷ and an "antisemitic crusade" in newspapers,

conjunction with the Antikomintern, Berlin, 1934. For Maximilian Harden he referred to Walter Frank, *Geist und Macht. Historisch-Politische Aufsätze*, Hamburg, 1938, as well as to J. Keller and Hanns Andersen, *Der Jude als Verbrecher*, Berlin, 1937. In addition, Fritzsche mentioned Alfred-Ingemar Berndt, *Gebt mir vier Jahre Zeit! Dokumente zum 1. Vierjahresplan des Fuehrers*, 5th and 6th edition, Munich, 1938, which contained a "lot of material on the Jews in Germany." The book by Keller and Andersen had already found its way into several editorial offices even prior to the press conference of 17 November. Thus in its edition of 12/13 November, the *Stader Tageblatt* made reference to the publication by Keller and Andersen in an editorial on the assassination of Ernst vom Rath. Wolfgang Fehrmann, "Die Waffe des Juden ist der Mord! Im ewigen Hass gegen das deutsche Volk," *ibid.* The author concerns himself with the character stereotype of the Jews as "fundamentally and basically criminal," their tendency "to murder," which in turn "corresponds to their negation of the rules and their anarchistic mentality, both of which stem from an inherent tendency towards Bolshevism." That previous August, the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question had already pointed out the high proportion of Jewish criminals. The *Helmstedter Kreisblatt* published an article on this topic on 11 August 1938: "Die Juden in der Kriminalistik. 50mal soviet Rechtsbrecher aus dem Judentum."

¹⁶ As per the press conference of 24 November 1938: Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 149. In the press conference of 25 November 1938, the participants were "reminded of the Jewish question, as will daily be the case from now on." *ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁷ Taken from Joseph Goebbels' diaries. Entry of 17 November 1938: Elke Froehlich, *Die Tagebuecher von Joseph Goebbels. Saemtliche Fragmente*, part 1, vol. 3, Munich, 1987, p. 535.

on radio, and in political assemblies.¹⁸ At the end of November he noted that Hitler was “very satisfied with the campaign against the Jews in the press.”¹⁹

The ministry's press conference was dominated by the tendency to portray the Jews as a threat to the German state, economy and society. To this end, the entire cache of antisemitic prejudices and stereotypes was emptied. Interesting is that compared with political prejudice, the prejudice of subversive activity diminishes considerably in the areas of the economy and culture. More important than this rather speculative evaluation is the campaign's intention to increasingly indoctrinate the German people and stir up antisemitic sentiment through the newspaper. The attempt to demonstrate the subversive activity of Jews relates to the period of contemporary history, as it was perceived from the perspective of the year 1938, beginning with the founding of Bismarck's Reich, a decisive national occurrence at the time. The telex version of the press conference also included a general statement to the effect that more should be written about the Jews "of earlier times, of prewar times." However, the literary references provided by Ziegler essentially related to contemporary history. The emphasis on contemporary history was paralleled with a reduction of Jewish history in Germany to the years subsequent to the founding of the German Reich. Previous periods - that of the often ostracized and persecuted ethnic-religious minority in the Middle Ages and early modern times, and the dynamic process of Jewish emancipation and assimilation within the framework of German civil society – were not even mentioned.

The antisemitic interpretation of contemporary history was intended to justify the pogrom of 9 November as well as the subsequent measures to exclude and repress the Jews. Furthermore, this view of German history legitimized also the justification of the National Socialist take over in 1933. In the end, the press campaign was meant to leave readers with the belief that history proved the compelling necessity of policies aimed against the Jews.

¹⁸ Froehlich, *Tagebuecher*, p. 537, entry of 18 November 1938.

¹⁹ Froehlich, p. 540, entry of 24 November 1938. After this date, Goebbels no longer mentioned the "campaign against the Jews" in his journals. Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 127, justifiably refers to "anti-Jewish propaganda" as the "topic of the winter of 1938-39."

On 19 November, in the first critical review of the campaign's progress, it was said, "in all newspapers, the series of articles must conclude with the clear message: German people, you have now been able to read how and where the Jews have harmed you!" Once the information campaign was underway, to behave as a friend of Jews was characterized as opposition to the regime. Thus, the historical line of reasoning and the urgent appeal to the German people immediately turned into an incitement for denunciation. Where there was a "national comrade" who did not support the suppression of the Jews, it was clear "that he was one of those who has still not comprehended the situation, one of those people who always say no. Make a note of him: those are the men who turn their backs on the Fuehrer."

The intent to increase the weight of antisemitism as an ideology of integration is shown by the determination to impose an antisemitic interpretation of contemporary German history. The campaign was consistently directed toward those who continued to evade this ideology. Berndt announced that the "German philistine" (*Spiesser*), was to be attacked within the framework of the campaign. By this he meant "the one percent of the people who have said "no" in the elections during the years since the government's take over by Hitler. The *Spiesser* were those people who "again sympathized with the Jews" they must "be silenced...within ten days." Upon closer examination of who was meant by "the *Spiesser*," one can recognize the followers of the major political groups prior to 1933; expressly named were the followers of Stresemann and Schleicher. In addition, the sceptics of Hitler's rule were referred to as those "who were frightened by the invasion of the Rhineland." According to Berndt, those Germans who rejected the antisemitic policies on the basis of their pre-National Socialist socialization and attitudes were the *Spiesser*. However, it quickly became obvious to the organizers of the campaign that by the mere mention of opponents of antisemitism, they were taking a risk. According to the press conference of 17 November, under no circumstances was one allowed to "create the impression, by means of headlines, that large parts of the population did not agree with the measures against the Jews."

It can be inferred from the campaign that, on the whole, antisemitism was regarded as insufficiently entrenched in the German population to have the desired integrating effect. In view of the tolerant or even friendly tendencies toward Jews that he had himself observed, on 24 November Berndt went so far as to acknowledge this lapse, declaring that the impression not be allowed to arise “that only the party and the state are antisemitic.”²⁰ Above and beyond this, the ministry was quite aware that it was the violence of the pogrom that met with disapproval, even repudiation. Contemporary reports reveal that the population particularly objected to what it considered “senseless” destruction, including the attack on private property.²¹ For this reason, the instructions to the press emphasized that on the one hand, “in Germany ... under all circumstances, the issue of the Jews” would be solved “once and for all,” yet on the other hand, “under no circumstances” would “acts of violence continue to take place.” In this respect, the press directive categorically declared that the rejection of violence be particularly emphasized in consideration of domestic sentiments.²²

Yet another aim of the press directive of 17 November was to increase the population's support of the government's antisemitic policies. The Ministry of Propaganda wanted the information campaign on the role of Jews in contemporary German history to be embedded in a complex of news that turned attention towards the treatment of Jews in other countries. “In the long

²⁰ Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 149.

²¹ William Sheridan Allen, “Die deutsche Oeffentlichkeit und die “Reichskristallnacht” - Konflikte zwischen Werthierarchie und Propaganda im Dritten Reich,” in: *Die Reihen fest geschlossen. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Alltags unter dem Nationalsozialismus*, Detlev Peukert and Juergen Reulecke, eds., Wuppertal, 1981, pp. 397-411, specifically pp. 402 ff.

David Bankier, *Die oeffentliche Meinung im Hitler-Staat. Die “Endloesung” und die Deutschen. Eine Berichtigung*, Berlin, 1995, pp. 118-122.

²² Wording of the telex. The rioting associated with the pogrom “continued until 13 November in some places.” Benz, *Rueckfall*, p. 32. In the press conference of 14 November 1938, Hans Fritzsche makes reference to the statement Goebbels had made the previous day “that from now on, the antisemitic demonstrations against Jewish shops must come to an end.” In a matter of “a few weeks,” there would not be any shops left anyway. Two days prior to that, an interview on the same subject had been granted to a representative of Reuter, Joseph Wulf, *Presse und Funk im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation*, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 104

term, perhaps in the next week” as never before, it was considered necessary to emphasize any event “that somehow demonstrates that foreign powers refuse to permit entry to the Jews,” mistreat them,²³ or incarcerate them in concentration camps. On the subject of concentration camps, Berndt cited the British policy during the Boer War, when twenty thousand women and children starved to death: “Women and children of a civilized people, not niggers.”²⁴ Thus the actions of the British in South Africa served as an example to the German people, who were undoubtedly aware of the fact that following the events surrounding 9 November Jews had been sent to concentration camps. Another example cited was the United States, which – “unlike any other country” - had solved the “issue of race” by “blocking the entry of unpleasant races by means of immigration laws.”²⁵ Australia, too, exemplified a country that refused to admit Jews because they were considered “foreign bodies.” Berndt said, “They want to force an overpopulated Germany to keep these parasites in the country, when there is room enough in the whole world to accommodate them.” He demanded that this behavior be characterized as antisemitic, as the “antisemitism of the others.” What the Ministry of Propaganda achieved by drawing a parallel between the German policy towards Jews with that of other countries was that all were shown as being confronted with the same problem.²⁶ It was charged that many countries had attempted to rid themselves of, or keep out, Jews. Thus antisemitism was depicted as the underlying trend of world politics. The message to the German

²³ Repeated during the press conference of 18 November 1938: Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 149.

²⁴ On this occasion, the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger* is praised for having published an article the previous day on “English colonial methods.” The atrocities committed by the English during the Boer War, in Palestine and in the American War of Independence had already been denounced in the press conference of 15 November 1938 and compared with “a couple” of windowpanes that had been broken on 9 November, Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 148.

²⁵ Wording of the telex.

²⁶ A call for describing in detail the antisemitism of other governments had already appeared in a press directive dated 17 May 1938, Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 146.

newspaper reader was: We do not stand alone in our antisemitism.²⁷ In this regard, the *NSK* adhered to the line of the Propaganda Ministry, and in December 1938 published a special issue on the echo and effect in many different countries around the world that had resulted from the persecution of Jews in the German Reich. Here, too, the central message was that "defense movements" against Jews existed in all countries.²⁸

The Ministry of Propaganda's argument to placate the German population had a realistic core: the suppression of Jews in Germany did in fact trigger off antisemitic attitudes in the governments of other countries. In January 1939, the Foreign Office informed all diplomatic representatives of the Reich that in the Scandinavian countries, Holland and France, to where many German Jews had immigrated, "a significant increase of antisemitism could be noted." The Foreign Office was confident it could develop a political concept out of this situation. It generated the idea that in the future, an "international solution to the Jewish question" would be possible, which could begin from the mutual understanding among all peoples that the Jews pose a threat.²⁹ Antisemitism

²⁷ Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 126, writes, that the "emphasis of the unfriendly treatment of the Jews in other countries" was to be understood as "justification of the rioting during the 'Reichskristallnacht'."

²⁸ "Der Feind aller Voelker," *NSK* issue no. 289. There is no date for this issue. It either appeared with no. 288 on 9 December 1938, a Friday, perhaps on 10 December 1938, a Saturday, or else together with no. 390 on 12 December 1938, a Monday.

²⁹ Series *Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militaergerichtshof* 32, Nuremberg, 1948, pp. 234-245. Circular directive by the Foreign Office to its agencies abroad, 25 January 1939: *Akten zur deutschen auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D (1937-1945), Volume 5, Baden-Baden, 1953, no.664. The circular directive was signed by Legationsrat 1st Class Emil Johannes Schumburg. For more information on his career with the Foreign Office see, *Akten zur deutschen auswaertigen Politik 1918-1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes*, Supplement to the series A-E, Goettingen, 1995, p. 506. A statement issued by the Office of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police on 19 april 1944 says that Schumburg had been "a kind of liaison officer to the RSHA for some time." SS Officer's File, Bundesarchiv Berlin, PK (formerly BDC), Schumburg, Emil, d.o.b. 14 May 1898. The close link to the practice of expelling the Jews is evident by the direct reference made to the looting of the Jews before their expulsion as beneficial to foreign policy. Thus, the Foreign Office emphasized that "the poorer and therefore more burdensome the immigrating Jew is for the immigration country, the more strongly the host country will

became an exportable item; the domestic antisemitic policy of the National Socialists expanded into a concept of world policy. In this regard, the work of the Ministry of Propaganda appears to have been meshed with foreign policy; in other words, domestic antisemitic activism would give German diplomacy a leading role in world policy.

However, the press conference of 17 November was dominated by ambivalence. A deliberate concession to the German population's hierarchy of values was made, thus recognizing that antisemitism might have to assume a subordinate position in situations where values associated with property and order had been deviated from.³⁰ In the antisemitic perspectives of politics, however, no concessions were made. The National Socialists did not waiver from the basic idea that liberation from "Jewish rule" represented one of the central tasks of German politics, which was to be pursued on an equal level with the other main objectives of Germany's struggle for a hegemonic position within Europe. However, since this also required that the population's hierarchy of values be acknowledged, the use of violence - as in the pogrom of 9 November - was expressly ruled out. In future, the solution to the "Jewish question" would be sought by means of laws and ordinances. It was believed that by making this concession, the status of antisemitism could be secured against the possible reordering of the hierarchy of values.

III

Aside from the swaying of the press by the Ministry of Propaganda, a close look at the press activity of the NSDAP, which was conducted by the Reich news office of the NSDAP and its press service *NSK*, reveals some coordination between the two institutions, at least regarding the dates of publication of certain news items. For example, the day after the Ministry of Propaganda's press conference, the *NSK* published a special issue on the

react, and the more desirable the effect will be in the interest of German propaganda." There are indications that in the winter of 1938-39, both Hitler and Himmler had hoped to be able to "export" German antisemitism: Hermann Graml, *Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und .Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich*, Munich, 1988, pp. 189 f

³⁰ Compare Allen, *Deutsche Oeffentlichkeit*, p. 402.

subject of "Judah's Debt of Guilt in Germany." It comprised thirty-nine pages and contained a plethora of suggestions for antisemitic accusations and attacks, which were in part identical with the press directives but contained independent elements as well.³¹

In an introductory article in its special issue, the *NSK* attempted to portray contemporary history as an uninterrupted series of attacks on the German people by Jews, which "had caused embitterment to spread to such an extent, that a logical reduction of the tension can only be achieved by means of the total elimination of the Jews not only from politics, but also from the German economy and cultural life."³² Reminiscent of the Ministry of Propaganda's press conference, an array of stereotypes was used. Everywhere the Jews were presented as enemies of the Reich and of humanity. They were typical assassins, criminals and murderers; the henchmen of foreign powers who "stab in the back" (*Dolchstoß*); the covert rulers of the economy, culture and science; "separatists"; the architects of economic boycotts, the malicious agitators in German emigrant circles; black marketers, controllers of the press, destroyers of the German soul through modern literature. "On the stage and on the screen, speculation over the lower instincts"³³ - Jews everywhere were described as undermining culture and morals. Individual social groups, for instance farmers, were portrayed as being suppressed by Jewish financial backers.³⁴

³¹ Fritzsche announced that the special issue would be "published somewhat later than usual and only be finished in the course of the morning." He recommended "making broad use" of the special issue, which was then published on 18 November 1938 as issue no. 270. The contributors to the special issue were listed on the last page; however, the individual articles are not expressly attributed to them (with the exception of the article written by J[örg] R[e]hoff, p. 13). The *NSK* issue no. 279, dated 29 November 1938, announced that the "great" special issue, which had sold out in the meantime, would be reissued.

³² "Israels Feldzug gegen das Reich," *ibid.*, p. 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 f.

³⁴ "Judas wirtschaftliches Schuldkonto: Gauner, Luegner, Spekulanten, Diebe," *ibid.*, pp. 28 f. Central in this regard are the articles: "Judenmanöver in der Landwirtschaft: Ernte ohne Saat," pp. 32 f., and "Bauerngueter in juedischer Hand: Raubzug gegen deutschen Boden," *ibid.*, pp. 33 f.

The press service of the NSDAP was better at managing the routine and detailed press coverage of antisemitic topics. An example is their review of the book *Bagatelles pour un massacre*, written by the French antisemite Louis Ferdinand Céline, upon the publication of its German translation.³⁵ On the day before the ministry's press conference, the *NSK* had already raised a topic that was to gain significance for the foreign policy strategy of the National Socialists – namely the reserve with which many Jews who were driven out of Germany were admitted into foreign countries.³⁶ Other articles dealt with the financial circumstances of those Jews still living in Germany, circumstances which were depicted as splendid.³⁷

In comparison with the press conference of the Ministry of Propaganda, the articles of the party's press service reflect a somewhat different character, as seen in the openness with which they pronounced a more intense persecution of Jews for the future. True, Berndt had requested representatives of the press to “always emphasize that for us, the problem of the Jews is naturally now going to be finally solved once and for all”; at the same time however, he declared that violent action had ended. In this regard, the special issue published by the *NSK* adopted an opposite standpoint, one that was knowingly meant to deviate from the Ministry of Propaganda's placating gesture. Under the headline “What did not work with kindness must work with harshness: The clear separation,” the party's press service claimed that up until that point, “the separation of the racially different Jews from the German people, also with the aim of spatial separation by means of migration,” had been conducted “in a strictly legal way.” The measures had been carried out in “as tolerable a way as possible.” However “this German position was not understood” and the German Jews had begun “to forget the seriousness of the situation.” After the murders of Wilhelm Gustloff and Ernst vom Rath, “patience had come to an end,” and “what remained unreachable

³⁵ The German title: *Die Judenverschwoerung in Frankreich*, Dresden, 1938; see also *NSK* issue no. 267 dated 13 November 1938.

³⁶ “Keiner will sie haben ... ‘Judenauslese’ in den Vereinigten Staaten,” *NSK* issue no. 269 dated 16 November 1938.

³⁷ “Wie lebt der Jude in Deutschland? Die Luege vom ‘armen Juden’,” *NSK* issue no. 268 dated 15 November 1938.

in kindness" would now be regulated "with harshness and inconsiderateness." The policies regarding the Jews would be "mercilessly carried through."³⁸ In fact, legal action was claimed to have guided the politics of the past; in contrast, a future policy of severe and merciless harshness was proclaimed. The *NSK* spoke openly about what had been avoided at the press conference. At the end of December, looking back at the "politics of justice," it was said that the year 1938 had "brought forth the legal foundation for the complete elimination of the Jews from all areas of life of the German people."³⁹

To assess how the antisemitic campaign was conducted in the provinces and states after 9 November, one would have to analyze an extensive collection of material, including film and radio, and not least, the speeches at political assemblies.⁴⁰ For example, the series of lectures on "Judaism and the Jewish Question," presented in January 1939 in the main lecture hall of the University of Berlin by the Reich Institute for the History of a New Germany, are of central importance.⁴¹ An exhibition called "The Wandering Jew," presented in Berlin and other towns, was also presumably related to the campaign.⁴²

³⁸ *NSK* issue no. 270, p. 18.

³⁹ "Grossdeutsche Rechtspolitik 1938," *NSK* issue no. 304 dated 29 December 1938, supplement: "Das Deutsche Recht."

⁴⁰ The conference of the Reichspropagandaamt Ost-Hannover, held in Luneburg on 9-11 December 1938, is an example of such a meeting. Dr. Wilhelm Ziegler of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda gave a lecture on the topic "The Solution of the Jewish Problem." "Die Loesung des Judenproblems. Vortrag von Pg. Wilhelm Ziegler auf der Presse- und Propagandatagung in Lueneburg," *Cellesche Zeitung*, 12 December 1938.

⁴¹ See Heiber, *Walter Frank*, pp. 627-630. The opening lecture given by Walter Frank, which was also broadcast on radio, was on the subject "Dreyfus - the Wandering Jew." A further nine speakers from the Institute held talks at the university every evening. According to Heiber, attendance "was unusually high, considering this was a scientific lecture series." p. 628.

⁴² Hans Timmer, "Zwei Welten. Dem ewigen Ahasver gegenueber - Gedanken bei einem Rundgang durch die aktuellste Ausstellung," *NSK* 285 (6 December 1938), pp. 4f. For more on the travelling exhibition, which was also shown in Dresden on 24 March 1939 after shows in Munich, Vienna, Berlin and Bremen, see: Victor Klemperer, *Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten. Tagebuecher 1933-1941*, 5th edition, Berlin, 1996, p. 467 including footnote. The poster announcing the exhibition appears in: *Wir schritten durch eine schweigende Stadt*.

A complete investigation of the reactions to the press directives of 17 November would require extensive analytical work which cannot be accomplished within the framework of this article. However, several important tendencies are discernible. The ministry soon realized that some regional and local newspapers were not able to carry out an information campaign in the form of a series of articles.⁴³ Indeed, many provincial newspapers did not react to the directive "within the next ten days" as promptly as the ministry had desired. All the same, samples taken from local newspapers in northwestern Germany show that they did comply with the ministry's directive, for instance the *Stader Tageblatt*⁴⁴ and the *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*.⁴⁵ In contrast, other newspapers - like the *Achimer Kreisblatt* - were unable to produce anything beyond short antisemitic news items⁴⁶ or aphorisms, like one of Martin Luther's comments on the Jews.⁴⁷ Instead of a series of articles, sometimes

Material fuer Schulen: Fuer die Opfer der Reichspogromnacht 1938 und ueber die Bremer Juden 1933 bis 1945, 3rd edition, Bremen, 1991, without pages.

⁴³ Press conference of 22 November 1938: Hagemann, *Presselenkung*, p. 149. Berndt reported on the Minister's dissatisfaction.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 21 November 1938; *ibid.*, 24 November 1938: "Israels Feldzug gegen das Reich. Revolte, Versklavung, Kriegshetze, Boykott und Mord" (with the key words "Jewish subversive activity" during the First World War, sabotage by Jewish Bolsheviks the signing of the Treaty of Versailles by Jews, organization of an economic boycott, as well as propaganda against Nazi Germany), and 25 November 1938: "Juedischer Raub! Das Bauerntum einst in Judas Klauen" *ibid.*, 26/27 November 1938: "Mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet. So wurde Literatur im juedischen Sumpf gemacht" (the central theme is "the Jewish control of German cultural life in its entirety").

⁴⁵ "Der Affe des Menschen," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 19-20 November 1938 (with the key sentence: "There is no community between the Jews and the Europeans!"); "Aus dem Ghetto in die Welt," 21 November 1938; "Raffsucht als Leitmotiv," 22 November 1938; "Mitleid ist Verrat. Nicht als Verfolger des Judentums fuehren wir diesen Kampf, sondern als Wahrer unseres Volkstums," 30 November 1938.

⁴⁶ "Juedische Schiebungen von riesigem Ausmass Juedischer "Diamantenklub" schmuggelt fuer 150 Millionen RM. Diamanten," 18 November 1938; "Lieder, auf die wir verzichten. Juedische Autoren" (proof that many traditional German songs had been composed by Jews), "Allein in Berlin 200 juedische Millionaere. Der Bluff mit den ausgepluenderten Juden - Zahlen gegen Maerchen," 17 November 1938.

⁴⁷ "Luther entlarvt die Juden," 22 November 1938. In general, Martin Luther was very useful. Compare, e.g. "Ein Wort Martin Luthers," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 23 November 1938. Also

individual articles on topics suggested by the ministry were published.⁴⁸

Incidentally, many newspapers published articles on the stereotypical Jewish criminal, on the great number of Jewish millionaires, or on the "antisemitism of the others,"⁴⁹ - topics that were meant to be discussed on a secondary level.

By making reference to local society and history, the anti-Jewish campaign in the regional organs of the press took on a special character. When the *Stader Tageblatt* published a report in a farming region on the "underhanded and vulgar methods with which the Jew gets his hands on the farmer," this of course carried a lot of weight. The article spoke of Jewish land speculation and Jewish food profiteers, affirming "that in the World War, the Jews shattered the German nutritional economy in order to break Germany's power of resistance." Thus it was not difficult for National Socialism to begin rebuilding on the rubble of the farming community, in particular during the years of inflation and the Great Depression.⁵⁰ Local news also confirmed the stereotype of the Jew as criminal.⁵¹

IV

Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich, "Luther und die Juden," in: *Antisemitismus. Von der Judenfeindschaft zum Holocaust*, Herbert A. Strauss and Norbert Kampe, eds., Frankfurt, 1985, pp. 47-65.

⁴⁸ A later article can presumably be attributed to a suggestion by the Ministry of Propaganda:

"Kriminalitaet des Judentums. In Deutschland steldie Juden 73 v. H. an den abgeurteilten Verbrechen," *Stader Tageblatt*, 24 November 1938.

⁴⁹ "Antijuedische Massnahmen in aller Welt," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 17 November 1938, with

the subheadings: "Konzentrationslager in Belgien, Antisemitische Welle in Amerika." Further

news in brief: "Wie die Juden die Voelker aussaugten" - "Ein Aufruf der Antijuedischen

Sammelbewegung Frankreichs" - "Das 'arme' Volk Israels" (with a report on Jewish large

property owners in Berlin, who had been registered in accordance with the regulation dated

26 February 1938). This continued with a collective report under the heading: "Ueberall

werden die Juden abgewiesen. Immer neue juedische Abwehrmassnahmen," 18 November

1938. "Politik der verschlossenen Tuer. 650 000 Juden aus Deutschland

auswanderungsbereit, USA will sie nicht," 2-6 December 1938.

⁵⁰ "Juedischer Raub! Das Bauerntum einst in Judas Klauen," *Stader Tageblatt*, 25 September

1938.

⁵¹ "Gerechte Strafe fuer juedische Betruenger," *Stader Tageblatt*, 12 December 1938.

Unlike the Ministry of Propaganda, regional newspapers did not restrict their anti-Jewish campaign to contemporary history. The *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, for example, printed excerpts from medieval city chronicles indicating a separation of Jews from non-Jews, and further, the repeated acts of violence against Jews. "As is again the case today," Jewish physicians were not allowed to treat non-Jewish patients.⁵² This newspaper attempted to portray the persecution of the Jews, as recorded in German cities in the Middle Ages, as a phenomenon of historical continuity that was common in medieval Europe, including England and France.⁵³ The Jews were also accused of having practiced ritual murder.

In general, in the decentralized press campaign, reports written from a local historical perspective gained special importance. The *Stader Tageblatt*, for example, reprinted an ordinance passed in 1825 by the State Bailiff of Stade, which dealt with permitting Jews to marry and their right of residence. The wording of the ordinance was preceded by a short introductory remark that placed the stereotype of the "cunning Jew," who understood how to squeeze himself through the loopholes of the law, into a current context.⁵⁴ Regional history also furnished cases that were meant to clearly demonstrate the Jewish proclivity to crime. Many newspapers in the northwestern area of Germany cited the robbery of the Golden Plaque, a particularly precious altar ornament that had been stolen by a band of thieves from Saint Michael's church in Luneburg, in 1698 and offered for sale in Hamburg by Jewish fences.⁵⁵ The *Stader Tageblatt* supplemented this news with a report on the

⁵² "Juden im Mittelalter. Aus Chroniken der deutschen Staedte," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 6 December 1938.

⁵³ Oskar Trautmann, "Was alte Chroniken erzaehlen. Judenaustreibungen in alter Zeit - Unschuldig verfolgt? Nein - schuldig geworden!," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 13 January 1938.

⁵⁴ "Die Juden im Jahre 1825. Eine Verordnung der Landdrostei Stade," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 22 November 1938.

⁵⁵ "Juedischer Raeuberstreich vor 240 Jahren. Juedische Gangsterbande beraubte die Goldene Tafel," *Stader Tageblatt*, 15 December 1938. "Juedischer Raeuberstreich vor 240 Jahren. Nickel List u. Co. raubten die Goldene Tafel," *Helmstedter Kreisblatt*, 20 December 1938. For the historical context showing a case of antisemitic journalism in 1699 see: Hans-

Dieter Schmid, "Das schwer zu bekehrende Juden-Hertz." Juedische Unterschicht und christlicher Antisemitismus am Beispiel des Celler Stadtpredigers Sigismund Hosemann," in:

current trial of a Jewish physician in Hamburg, and a brief report on "thirty Jewish millionaires," also in Hamburg.⁵⁶

Continuing to look at the course of the news campaign in the northwestern area of Germany, the important role of a series of articles published at the end of 1938 by the *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung*, the main organ of the NSDAP in Hanover, particularly stands out.⁵⁷ The author of the series, who pompously claimed to "present the first coherent account of the history of Judaism in Lower Saxony," was Dr. Hans Mauersberg from the Gau Office of Racial Policy.⁵⁸ In the series, the details of German-Jewish history were put into a context that spanned centuries. This history had always been affixed the antisemitic interpretation that the German forefathers had no choice but to treat the Jews harshly, as they could not have otherwise held their ground against the Jewish claims to power. Mauersberg explained that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a large number of Jews had settled in the large and small cities of Lower Saxony, but that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

Christen und Juden. Ein notwendiger Dialog, Peter Antes et al., eds., Hanover, 1988, pp. 39-60.

⁵⁶ "Und heute!," *ibid.*; "30 juedische Millionaere in Hamburg," *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Hans Mauersberg, born in 1910, received his doctorate from the University of Berlin. His dissertation carried the title *Besiedlung und Bevoelkerung des ehemals hennebergischen Amtes Schleusingen*, Wurzburg, 1938. He subsequently wrote *Beitraege zur Bevoelkerungs- und Sozialgeschichte Niedersachsens. Studien zur Volkskoerperforschung Niedersachsens*.

Veroeffentlichungen aus dem Rassenpolitischen Amt der NSDAP, Gau Suedhannover-Braunschweig, vol. 1, Hanover, 1938. The director of the Rassenpolitisches Amt was Hans-

Helmut Rehkopf, who co-published this series of works with Mauersberg. Mauersberg qualified as a university lecturer in 1962 at the University of Munich. His main areas of work are given as economic, population and social history: *Kuerschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender*, 11th edition, Berlin, 1970, pp. 1891; 12th edition, Berlin, 1976, p. 2028.

⁵⁸ "Die Geschichte des Judentums in Niedersachsen. Im 12. Jahrhundert kommen sie als 'Emigranten,' erringen bedeutende Macht und werden wieder vertrieben," *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung*, 28 December 1938; "Wie die Juden sich wieder im Lande breit machten. Das

Wiedererstarken des Judentums in Niedersachsen vom Beginn der Neuzeit bis zur Emigration," *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung*, 29 December 1938; "Judas Weg zum

Hoehepunkt seiner Macht. Die Emanzipation des Judentums und ihr Durchbruch zur Macht im 19. Jahrhundert," *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung*, 30 December 1938. All articles

included antisemitic drawings by Rolf Wilde. I occasionally rearranged the quotes.

- as had already occurred in cities in the Rhineland - they were expelled in several phases. Mauersberg attributed this sequence of events to the resistance of the local population against Jews who were beginning to gain control over "Lower Saxony's economy." With the tone of voice of a storyteller skilled in conveying important lessons from the past, Mauersberg explained: "the people" came to their senses "and expelled the strangers from the country not only by means of their persecution, but also by means of state laws. They were kept away from commercial life and gradually also from trade by means of ordinances implemented by the community of guilds. ... At the onset of the sixteenth century," there was nothing left "of the former Jewish positions of power in the cities of Lower Saxony."

However, persecution and other restrictive measures were "not successful in exterminating the Jews," continued Mauersberg. "Unbroken in their urge for conquest and inspired by an even stronger will to recapture territory once lost," with the privileges granted the Jews by the princes governing the territory of Lower Saxony, in the seventeenth century they were allowed to resettle and to establish a regional rabbinate with its center in the new town of Hanover. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Jews "had again so much strengthened their positions, that these ... constituted the centers from which - in continuance of the emancipatory efforts of the nineteenth century - they would seize the decisive power of the people in the first third of the twentieth century." With its ideals of equality and fraternity, the French Revolution had led the "German people" to accept the notion of "tolerating a new position of Jewish power within Germany's boundaries," and, upon enactment of the law of 30 September 1842 in the Kingdom of Hanover, taking a step towards emancipation. Mauersberg did recognize the general social movement that gave rise to this development; however, he stresses that within the framework of this movement the Jews had "worked for themselves." Starting out from their emancipation, the Jews then "lined up for their triumphal march to rule over the German people," in order to erect "the strongholds of their foreign rule" in the villages and cities, at the University of Goettingen, as well as "in the offices, department stores and administrative offices." These strongholds were not won back until the National Socialists

stepped into power. Mauersberg summed up his series of articles by stating that "the up and down" of Jewish rule in Lower Saxony must be considered a warning for the future. He closed with the firm injunction that after their expulsion by means of "persecution" and the enactment of "state laws," the return of the Jews "to power" must be prevented.

Based on antisemitism, Mauersberg's articles provided a comprehensive interpretation of the regional history of German-Jewish relations. In this historical interpretation, the persecution of Jews in the late Middle Ages became a focal point and was made to serve as a benchmark for current policy making. The pogroms of the Middle Ages became models for contemporary National Socialist politics and represented a treasure chest of experience worth digging up. The repeated references to past pogroms served to validate the politics of the present. Mauersberg thus set a standard for the news campaign of the winter of 1938-39.

An article on the local history of the Jews published in the *Celler Beobachter*, a supplement to the *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung* for the town of Celle, showed that this standard had lent antisemitic journalism a new quality, which was quite in line with the radicalization of the press after 9 November.⁵⁹ The author of the article was Otto von Boehn, archivist of Celle. Despite the fact that it was also printed in a supplement to the main organ of the Hanover NSDAP, the version of the article printed in the *Celler Beobachter* did not include any mention of the takeover of power by the Jews or their subsequent expulsion. Nonetheless, references to antisemitic stereotypes are obvious. The article says, for example, that the Jews in Celle had restricted themselves "almost solely to commercial activity...as was the case throughout Germany," and that they had avoided "any kind of physical labor." The article emphasized the numerous restrictive regulations by which Jews were required to abide, for example when establishing a business. The expulsion of "begging Polish Jews" in the year 1825 was also mentioned. Yet, von Boehn made no reference to "the Jew" in the singular, an otherwise stereotypical expression officially used by the NSDAP when referring to Jews

⁵⁹ Peter Stein, *Die nordostniedersaechsische Tagespresse. Von den Anfaengen bis 1945. Ein Handbuch*, Stade, 1994, p. 157.

as a social group.⁶⁰ The editors of the *Celler Beobachter* attempted to heighten the anti-Jewish character of the text by the use of subheadings.⁶¹ They also considered it necessary to provide a commentary. In a preliminary remark, they made reference to the restrictive regulations in the town of Celle emphasized by von Boehn, and added that

Three hundred years ago, our ancestors kept the Jews extraordinarily short, and they will have well known why. It was the distortion of the notion of freedom by the French Revolution that first emancipated the Jew to such a degree, that he could again begin the old game of gaining control

⁶⁰ “Die Geschichte der Juden in Celle,” published in five episodes with alternating subheadings: “Schon 1530 ‘Zwei Jodden’ - Man weiss nicht, woher sie kamen - Kontrolle ueber Kontrolle,” *Celler Beobachter*, 10 January 1939; “Hauserwerb und Belastung des Besitzes durch Steuern und Abgaben,” *ibid.*, 11 January 1939; “Handel und Erwerbsverhaeltnisse: ‘Kommerziell’ bevorzugt - Was war juedische Handelsware? - Einheimische und fremde Juden - Eine interessante Statistik,” *ibid.*, 12 January 1939; “Religioeser Gegensatz - Judentaufen - Die Sabbatruhe - Schulen und Synagogen - Wenn zwei heiraten wollten,” *ibid.*, 13 January 1939; “Der Judenfriedhof - Kultur und Kunst - Liberalist Salomo Philipp Gans,” *ibid.*, 14/15 January 1939. Von Boehn, who held the job title of Retired State Garden Inspector, had been commissioned in 1935 by the City of Celle - at the request of the State Academy for the Cultivation of Race and Hygiene in Dresden - to write his article. The Academy had planned to publish a history of the Jews in German cities, which, however, was never realized. See “Innerstaedtische Korrespondenzen im Stadtarchiv Celle 1 D 23a.” Heiber mentions the State Academy, p. 423. Von Boehn's article, by the way, was reprinted in *Zur Geschichte der Juden in Celle. Festschrift zur Wiederherstellung der Synagoge*, Celle, 1974, pp. 9-15. This book, published by the City of Celle, cited the source of the article: the *Celler Beobachter*. The following comment, characteristic for the city's self-image, appeared on p. 16: “It is typical of the attitude of the population of Celle towards the Jews in the period after 1933 that such an article could have been written - a careful and objective article that strictly adheres to the records of the City Archives - above all, however, that it could have been published in its original form in a daily newspaper.” After a number of objections, this passage was removed from a later edition of the publication without comment

⁶¹ One of the subheadings, for example, read “Konkurrent ‘Billig’ ist da!” (trade disagreements between Jewish and non-Jewish businessmen in Celle during the 17th century). Another subheading read “Die ueppigen Judenweiber” (the focus was on the wide hoop skirts that had to be removed at “school” as they took up too much space.)

over people by poisoning their intellects and with the help of money. ...
What we are experiencing now is the reaction to this.

The editors' closing remark resounded with meaning: "Let us learn from the past."

In their preliminary remark, the editors of the *Celler Beobachter* implied what they expected from an article on the history of the Jews; it should demonstrate "that what is happening today to the Jews in Germany and in other countries is definitely nothing new or unheard of." Again we meet with the line of thought that portrays the actions of 9 November and the weeks thereafter as an established and proven practice based on experience. The Ministry of Propaganda's press conference had placed emphasis on actions against Jews in other countries; by referring to medieval and early modern history, these actions would be viewed as being in accord with the past. This placed new demands on articles meant to serve the purposes of antisemitic indoctrination. Although the reader might approve of the restrictions against the Jews as enumerated in a traditionally antisemitic text like the one written by von Boehn, there was, however, another step that Mauersberg clearly espoused in his article - persecution and expulsion. After 9 November, readers were expected to identify with this next step, which could be associated with both violence and legal measures.

Lessons of the past were to be applied to the present. The press conference of 17 November had already aspired to this.⁶² In the local and regional press, a geographical point of contact was now added to the temporal one - contact between past and present places and regions. This resulted in combining the strength of both the local and regional worlds and the lives of the people therein, which had always contained elements of history and which expressed itself as local or regional history - *Heimatgeschichte*. This helped to

⁶² See Dr. Wilhelm Ziegler in the conference of the *Reichspropagandaamt Ost-Hannover* from 9-11 December 1938: "What is happening today in Germany and in other countries ... is not occurring for the first time in the history of Judaism and other people:" "Die Loesung des Judenproblems. Vortrag von Pg. Ziegler auf der Presse- und Propagandatagung in Lueneburg," *Cellesche Zeitung*, 12 December 1938.

create a feeling of closeness to, and familiarity with one's own home town.⁶³

Local and regional history provided antisemitism with an extraordinarily useful vehicle that penetrated social spheres not usually conducive to political propaganda. The planners of the press campaign in the Ministry of Propaganda had obviously overlooked this aspect of history. It did not lie directly in their field of vision, as their conception of the campaign, including instructions to the press, encompassed the entire Reich. However, the turn towards regional history was eagerly taken up by the provincial press, which had always represented an area of journalism in which antisemitic attitudes and stereotypes were common. With a certain amount of autonomy, the local and regional press took advantage of particularly favorable opportunities for propagating antisemitic positions. The powerful effect this had is attested to by notes on a conversation held at the time between the technician Karl Duerkefaelden and his father. Duerkefaelden's father, who ran a small farm east of Hanover, had read the article written by Mauersberg in the *Niedersaechsische Tageszeitung*. When, at the beginning of January 1939, he was asked by his son if Jewish shops had also been destroyed in Peine during the pogrom, he evaded the question with the reply: "Didn't you read what havoc the Jews used to create here?" This was precisely the effect the newspaper article was designed to have.⁶⁴

After 9 November, the press service of the NSDAP went its own way in the antisemitic manipulation of national history. It was also confronted with the thorny question: to what extent would the population help to implement the anti-Jewish policies of the National Socialists, and how far did these policies correspond with the will of the population. The *NSK* wrote: "The crudest

⁶³ Everhard Holtmann and Winfried Killisch, *Lokale Identitaet und Gemeindegebietsreform. Der Streitfall Ermerhausen. Empirische Untersuchungen ueber Erscheinungsformen und Hintergruende oertlichen Protestverhaltens in einer unterfraenkischen Landgemeinde*, Erlangen, 1991, pp. 48-50. On the connection between political interests and political concern on the one hand, and the affinity with and feelings for heimat on the other hand, see: Heiner Treinen, "Symbolische Ortsbezogenheit. Eisoziologische Untersuchung zum Heimatproblem," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 17 (1965), pp. 73-97, 254-297

⁶⁴ Herbert und Sibylle Obenaus, eds., "*Schreiben, wie es wirklich war ... Aufzeichnungen Karl .Duerkefaeldens aus den Jahren 1933-1945*," Hanover, 1983, p. 90

instrument of foreign agitation is wanting to create the impression that there is a rift between popular National Socialist leadership and the German people by asserting that antisemitism is a party slogan meant to trigger off a racial struggle in which the people have no interest.”⁶⁵ In order to refute claims of a division between leadership and the people, the *NSK* published a series of articles that were meant to "prove that the German people are an antisemitic people." In accordance with National Socialist ideology, the enmity between Germans and Jews, which had been proven many times in the history of Germany, could be accounted for by race: "Based on the laws of his race and his natural instinct, the German has had a sharply defensive and rejective attitude towards Judaism in all epochs." It had always been the "racial sensitivity" of the Germans that had compelled them to "separate" themselves from the Jews. Finally, a close connection between Germans and National Socialist ideology was derived from the historical enmity towards Jews, based on a "fundamental" antisemitic "philosophy." National Socialism was the fulfillment of everything the people had ever wanted. Or, in the words of the *NSK*: "With all of their characteristics, the German people were finally united and revived in the National Socialist idea.”⁶⁶

The *NSK* series began with an article on the "Laws passed by the Germanic kings pertaining to the Jews." On the one hand advocating the policy of separation from the Jews, the article also castigated the church's obstruction of the "Germanic defense movement," This was a reference to the fact that the church had repeatedly attempted to overcome Judaism by means of baptism, thus "disregarding ... the primary racial difference" and driving "a wedge between the leaders and the people.”⁶⁷ Another article began with the early Middle Ages when the economic status of the Jews had made them indispensable to the princes and town dwellers, but hated by the country

⁶⁵ "Antisemitisches Volk. Die deutsche Geschichte widerlegt Auslandshetze - Zur neuen *NSK* -Artikelserie," *NSK* 282, (2 December 1938), pp. 3ff. The article carries the initials of the deputy editor-in-chief of the *NSK* Wilhelm Ritgen; see footnote 1, above

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ "Antisemitisches Volk (I): Die Judengesetze der Germanenkoenige. Abwehr und Erkennung der Judengefahr in fruehester Zeit. Das 'Westgotische Gesetz' verbot Ehen mit Juden," *ibid.*, pp. 4 f

people.⁶⁸ The article applied the same image of the Jews to the late Middle Ages, its central theme now being the "exploitation of the people by profiteers." This gave rise to hatred by the people, though it was again and again "made inactive" by Jews, who "cleverly" manipulated "the balance of power between municipality, princes and the emperor," playing one against the other. The author follows this up with the politically unambiguous comment :

Despite all of the good and right approaches, the removal of the Jews from the life of the people failed. The people did not have a leader whom they sustained with their spirit, they did not have a united Reich necessary for uniformly and effectively carrying out all measures. The foundation for the successful solution of the Jewish issue in the Third Reich lies in the existence of these prerequisites.

The author does not fail to make the point that in the Middle Ages, intellectuals also joined the barricades against the Jews. He places particular emphasis on Martin Luther.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ "Antisemitisches Volk (II)," H[einz] Ballensiefen, "Nackt moeget ihr ausziehen!" Wachsende Volksauflehnung gegen die Juden im fruehen Mittelalter - Schutzbriefe als Dokumente voelkischen Widerstandes gegen die Ausbeuter - Die Gunst der Fuersten ergaunert," *NSK* 283, (3 December 1938), pp. 3. In 1941, Ballensiefen worked for *SS-Standartenfuehrer* Franz Alfred Six in Office VII, "Ideological Research and Evaluation," of the RSHA. His department VII B 1 was responsible for "Freemasonry and Judaism." In 1944 - he had received his doctorate and been promoted to the rank of *SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer* in the meantime - his field of activity was in Hungary. Here, among other things, he controlled the Hungarian Institute for the Research of the Jewish Question, which he had co-founded: Juergen Matthaues, "Weltanschauliche Forschung und Auswertung." Aus den Akten des Amtes VII im Reichssicherheitshauptamt," *Jahrbuch fuer Antisemitismusforschung*, 5 (1996), pp. 287-330, specifically pp. 290 f. The documents published herein also deal with Ballensiefen's scientific work.

⁶⁹ "Antisemitisches Volk (III), Volksempoerung gegen Judenpest. Wie stand das deutsche Volk im Mittelalter zur Judenfrage? - Gemeinsame Auflehnung gegen schamlose Ausbeutung .- Voelkischer Instinkt weckte drastische Massnahmen," *NSK* 284 (4 December 1938), pp. 5ff

For the German principalities of the early modern era, the court Jew is portrayed as the determining social element. Noted too are the efforts made by the line of princesses and princes from Maria Theresa to Frederick the Great to limit the influence of Jews; however, the argument is somewhat weakened by the author's acknowledgement of the usefulness, time and again of the court Jews to the princes. Nevertheless, the author seeks recourse in the politically explicit rule that the bad or good treatment of the Jews was dependent on the strength or weakness of a prince.⁷⁰

Then the article states, the Enlightenment came "to the aid" of the Jews. Prussia modeled its Emancipation Edict of 1812 on France's granting the Jews citizenship with equal rights following the Revolution. The edict was drawn up by State Chancellor Hardenberg, who was "dependent on the Jews because of financial difficulties." The author further adds that the people "had had no time to defend themselves against this outrageous attack on their existence. The wars of liberation required their effort." Not until after the Vienna Congress and the end of the war were the people in a position to protest against the emancipation of the Jews and to "ardently" demand "returning the Jews to their old legal positions." With its anti-emancipatory tendencies, the restoration - this concept is not used in the article - thus appears in a positive light.⁷¹ The last article in the *NSK* series outlines further steps taken towards granting the Jews equal status as citizens up until the constitution of the *Norddeutscher Bund*. Again, the names of the main authorities opposed to emancipation are mentioned - Otto von Bismarck, Heinrich von Treitschke and Richard Wagner. The antisemitic "people's movement" at the close of the nineteenth century was also doomed to failure. "The attempt to achieve success by parliamentary means was hopeless from the start. The powerful social democracy, overrun by Jews, voted down all

⁷⁰ "Antisemitisches Volk (IV),: H[einz] B[allensiefen], Koenige gegen Hofjuden. Deutsche Fuersten beschraenken 'juedische Rechte' - Jeder starke Koenig war Judengegner, jeder schwache Judenknecht - 'Ich kenne keine aergere Pest'," *NSK* 286 (7 December 1938). pp. 5f.

⁷¹ "Antisemitisches Volk (V)," H[einz] B[allensiefen], Staatsbuengerrechte gegen Volkswillen. Volksauflehnung gegen die Judenemanzipation - Auch getarnt stets erkannt - Juedische .Ausbeutung der Freiheitskriege," *NSK* 288, (9 December 1938), pp. 4ff

motions for the formation of a party.” The enmity of the people against the Jews only found “fulfillment in the legislation of the Third Reich...National Socialism paid complete tribute to the public feeling for the first time in that it made racial knowledge the foundation of its Jewish legislation and carried through with the separation of blood. Thus the struggle that the German people had led against the foreign intruders for centuries had finally come to an effective close.”⁷²

V

The series of articles on the "antisemitic people" was part of the effort to persuade the German population to adopt the attitude towards Jews that was desired and hoped for by the party. The interpretation of national history as one governed by a fundamental philosophy of hatred towards Jews - a history also dominated by antisemitism, pogroms and expulsion - was supported by a historical construction that assessed Jews in terms of a continual division between the elite and the people, and ultimately it was the people who always knew how to correctly assess them. Only now and then did the leading figures, (one or another prince) comprehend the people's real attitude towards the Jews. The National Socialists cleverly point this angle in 1933 - that it was the "national longing" (*voelkische Sensucht*) of Germans to attain their "ultimate separation" from the Jews.⁷³

With its appeal to "antisemitic people," the press campaign had reached a certain climax; the one-sidedness and simplifications of the campaign achieved a high degree of credibility through its official pronouncement by the party. It combined important points of criticism - for example the church's position on baptism of Jews - with praise of a strong nation, which implied praise for the National Socialist state. National history thus became the

⁷² "Antisemitisches Volk (VI)," H[einz] B[allensiefen], *Erfuellung nach jahrhundertelangem Kampf. Von Judas Sieg zu seiner Bezwingung durch den Nationalsozialismus. Religiöse Tarnung und rassistische Erkenntnis - Die Sprecher des Volkswillens im 19. Jahrhundert,* NSK .291, (13 December 1938), pp. 1ff

⁷³ NSK 282 (2 December 1938), pp. 3 f

teacher of the nation, and the National Socialists the executors of the lessons to be extracted from history.

The antisemitic manipulation of German history was nothing new. It had a long tradition. Even in the articles published by Mauersberg and the *NSK* and their foundation in regional and national history, respectively, was no exception. It is noteworthy that both series of articles started out from different concepts. Mauersberg kept with tradition by using the stereotype of the Jewish quest for power, which focuses on the subordination of the non-Jewish environment. For this reason it can be said that he endeavored to provide a comprehensive interpretation of German-Jewish history from the Middle Ages to the modern era. This stands in contrast to the *NSK*'s concept, which worked more intensely with the social construct of "the people" and attributed them with special knowledge about, and experience with, Jews. The *NSK* could support this concept by drawing on the change that occurred in German historiography at the time, that is, viewing history from a national point of view.⁷⁴ By mystifying the people, the *NSK* could be considered more modern, and at the same time more National Socialistic than Mauersberg. Both concepts existed simultaneously and did not contradict each other; they merely complemented historical material in different ways. They could both interpret the "abnormality" of the pogrom of 9 November 1938 as the "normality" of the German treatment of the Jews, and ultimately refer to the seizure of power in 1933 as an act of liberation through which German history reached fulfillment.

Convincing newspaper readers of the correctness of Nationalist Socialist policies towards Jews was not the sole aim of steering the press. Above and beyond this, its task was to deal with the problem of how the central German ideology of integration – nationalism – stood in relation to the central element of National Socialist ideology – antisemitism. M. Rainer Lepsius claimed that "the Third Reich ... was founded much more on belief in German nationalism

⁷⁴ Karen Schoenwaelder, "Akademischer Antisemitismus. Die deutschen Historiker in der NS-Zeit," *Jahrbuch fuer Antisemitismusforschung*, 2 (1993), pp. 200-229, specifically pp. 213 f.

For more details on this topic, see: Karen Schoenwaelder, *Historiker und Politik, .Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1992

than on agreement with the National Socialist ideology.”⁷⁵ If one continues this train of thought, this could well have given rise to the fear that an essential element of National Socialist ideology - antisemitism - would be pushed into the background during the weeks and months of the unification of Austria and the Sudetenland with the German Reich. The central role of antisemitism in Nazi ideology, especially its function of combining “antagonistic parts ... for instance anti- bolshevism and verbal anti-capitalism,” made action necessary.⁷⁶ In this respect, the pogrom and its consequences were possibly a welcome occurrence, in order to consciously emphasize antisemitism in a period of national enthusiasm. From a propagandistic point of view, it was now simply a matter of amalgamating both ideologies, a task for which history lent itself. An investigation of the sources shows that this issue was acknowledged and realized by the Ministry of Propaganda, as well as by the party's press service.

At the Ministry of Propaganda's press conference, the predominance of both ideologies in the creation of integration can be clearly demonstrated by referring to the character of the "*Spiesser*." According to the Ministry of Propaganda's descriptions, he represented a group of people who combined National Socialism with a traditionally antisemitic attitude, but who more or less tolerated the Jews - at least not denying them their right to exist. The Ministry of Propaganda attacked the "*Spiesser*" as the most dangerous adversary to the radically antisemitic consensus, one who questioned the policy of excluding Jews from German society.

In contrast to the suggestions made by the Ministry of Propaganda, the party's press service was quite clear on the question of competing ideologies.

⁷⁵ M. Rainer Lepsius, "Das Erbe des Nationalsozialismus und die politische Kultur der Nachfolgestaaten des 'Grossdeutschen Reiches'," in: *Kultur und Gesellschaft*, Max Haller, Hans-J. Hoffmann-Nowotny and Wolfgang Zapf, eds., commissioned by the German, Austrian and Swiss Society for Sociology, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, pp. 247-264, specifically pp. 253f.

⁷⁶ Hans Mommsen, "Die Funktion des Antisemitismus im 'Dritten Reich.' Das Beispiel des Novemberprogroms," in: *Antisemitismus. Von religioeser Judenfeindschaft zur Rassenideologie*, Guenther Brakelmann and Martin Rosowski, eds., Goettingen 1989, pp. 179-192, specifically p. 184

Like the ministry, the *NSK* deliberated as to how it should handle those who eluded the anti-Jewish campaign after 9 November - namely, those whom Berndt had called the "*Spiesser*." The *NSK* carefully adhered to the advice that under no circumstances would it convey the impression that the group of "those who said no" was large. Accordingly, they used the term "a handful of political late-risers" who would not "hear or see or read anything." In keeping with Berndt, this group was described as bourgeois, liberal and individualistic. They asked themselves, "What have the Jews got to do with me?" in order to avoid having to give an opinion on the issue, just as one had once said: "What have the others got to do with you? You cast your ballot just like Gustav Stresemann. (*Was gehen Dich die andern an, Du wählst wie Gustav Stresemann.*) The others," the *NSK* continued, "were us Nazis and 'other people'." The party press service then began to refer more frequently to this group as "intellectuals - with an 'educated' vocabulary." They were also called "bourgeois intellectuals" and "outsiders." Elsewhere they are noted as those people whose advancement was made possible - and whose "pensions" were secured - by the National Socialist state. Without question, a part of the social elite referred to here, profited from National Socialism, yet did not help - or only partially helped - to support the persecution of Jews. The *NSK* wanted both to defame opponents of the persecution of Jews as a minority outside of the national community and to arouse hostility against intellectuals and educated people, indeed against the old elite in its entirety. At the same time, it was claimed that National Socialist policies were supported by the wide majority of the people.⁷⁷

Following this fairly clear characterization of that part of the social elite that profited from National Socialism, yet kept its distance from the core area of National Socialist ideology - radical antisemitism⁷⁸ - the *NSK* discussed in great detail and depth the subject of competition between the central

⁷⁷ Ernst Guenter Dickmann, "Was gehen mich die Juden an? Der Volksgenosse und die Judenfrage - Gruendliche Aufklaerung bis zum letzten Mann," *NSK* 280 (30 November 1938), pp. 2ff.

⁷⁸ For more details on the consequences of this distance, see Mommsen, "Funktion des .Antisemitismus," p. 183

ideologies of integration of nationalism and National Socialism. The *NSK* claimed that it was indeed "not difficult" to be proud of national successes, "when the squadrons of the Luftwaffe thunder over the Zeppelin Lawn in Nuremberg, or when our young Wehrmacht march through the streets, or when ten million Germans return home to the Reich cheering emphatically and thankfully."⁷⁹ National sentiment grew naturally after the Treaty of Versailles was signed upon rearmament, and the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland turned the German Reich into the Great German Reich. However, in addition, it was necessary that the people develop an understanding of "the political process" which reinforced the exclusion of Jews from German society. Opponents to the persecution of Jews - those nationalists who lacked a sense of the correctness of National Socialism, in particular radical antisemitism - were denied membership in the "national community...Today, the 'simple' national comrade, who sees the last mask torn from the Jew's face and who trusts that the leaders are doing everything for the benefit of the people...may rightfully refuse to tolerate being bothered by a few frightened souls standing on the fringe."⁸⁰

The competition between the two ideologies of integration, which was criticized by the authorities responsible for steering the press, may be the point of departure for a critique of the view held by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen of the dominance of an eliminatory antisemitism. In his opinion, "well before the Nazis came to power ... a virulent and violent 'eliminationist' variant of antisemitism" had developed, "which called for the elimination of Jewish influence or of Jews themselves from German society."⁸¹ The discussion that ensued after 9 November shows that even at this time, which coincided with the greatest successes of domestic and foreign policy, National Socialist

⁷⁹ Mommsen, "Funktion des Antisemitismus," p. 3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, London, 1996, p. 23. A further analysis of Goldhagen can be omitted here as his notions of the "ordinary German," which are strangely similar to those of an "antisemitic people," have already been analyzed in depth: Ruth Bettina Birn and Volker Riess, "Das Goldhagen Phaenomen oder: Fuenfzig Jahre danach," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 49 (1988), pp. 80-95.

propaganda was still concerned with the population's acceptance of its antisemitic program, that was geared towards the exclusion of Jews from German society. In any case, it is doubtful whether one can speak of an "acceptance" of this ideology in the political consciousness of the people. In my opinion, doubts about whether this ideology was accepted are indeed valid, because while insisting that the anti-Jewish policy be accepted - one could also say, while courting the self-image of the Germans as an "antisemitic people" - only the liberal and national conservative elite were being addressed. Or, to put it in the words of the *NSK*: it was the "last remaining, footsore rearguard of Stresemann's Foot Guard."⁸² These were the only ones criticized for their lack of understanding of "the political process" of complete separation from Jews. Other social groups, above all the working class, were not mentioned at all, although in this circle, too, only limited approval of an eliminatory antisemitism could be expected.⁸³ And finally, complete silence prevailed with regard to that part of the population that had no interest whatsoever in the fate of the German Jews.⁸⁴ The reason for the failure to mention working-class people and other groups with non-conforming opinions undoubtedly lies in the calculation that to criticize other social groups would lead to the collapse of the "vanishing minority." As mentioned above, this minority was said to consist of the one percent of "those people who had said no" in the elections after the National Socialists took power and who did not support the persecution of Jews and their exclusion from German society. Thus no doubt is cast on the strength of the support for the regime in 1938;

⁸² *NSK* 265, p. 2.

⁸³ See Mommsen, "Funktion des Antisemitismus," p. 183, who writes that among the working class, antisemitism plays "virtually no role whatsoever." See Rosemarie Leuschen-Seppel, "Arbeiterbewegung und Antisemitismus," in: *Antisemitismus. Von religioeser Judenfeindschaft zur Rassenideologie*, Guenther Brakelmann and Martin Rosowski, eds., Goettingen 1989, pp. 77-96

⁸⁴ Compare the list of social groups that criticized the anti-Jewish politics of the regime: Ian Kershaw, "German Popular Opinion and the 'Jewish Question,' 1939-1943: Some further Questions," in: *Die Juden im Nationalsozialistischen Deutschland/The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1943*, Arnold Paucker, ed., Tuebingen, 1986, pp. 365-86, specifically pp. 369 f., 383.

See also Bankier, *Oeffentliche Meinung*, pp. 123-138.

however, there was obviously more support on a national level and less for the core area of National Socialist ideology - antisemitism.

After 9 November, however, the policy pursued regarding German Jews was certainly intended to be eliminationist. The press campaign in the winter of 1938-39 coincided with the redirecting of propaganda efforts towards the immediate preparation for war after the Munich conference, which would have suggested to the leaders of the NSDAP that antisemitic activities be intensified.⁸⁵ The campaign was intended to prepare the population - with a wealth of incisive measures – for what was still in store for German Jews. By introducing historical and regional dimensions, the campaign revitalized the traditions of German antisemitism with a high degree of urgency. It openly pronounced relentlessness and harshness. The purpose of this turn in the campaign was to confront the Germans with their national history and to force them to acknowledge this history - to acknowledge it as their own historical and national identity, and at the same time acknowledge antisemitism in its barbaric variant, that is, eliminationist antisemitism. With this new clarity of concepts and language - but also with the clarity of the interpretation of history and its praise for the barbarity of the pogroms in Germany during the Middle Ages - it was consistent that, ultimately, Hitler would openly pronounce the future prospects for the Jews. In his speech before the German Reichstag on 30 January 1939, he declared that should a world war again occur, the result would be “the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe.”⁸⁶

Source: Herbert Obenaus ,The Germans:”An Antisemitic People.” The Press Campaign after 9 November 1938, David Bankir (ed), *Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, German Society and the Persecution of the Jews, 1933-1941*, Yad Vashem. 2000. pp. 147-181

⁸⁵ Reference to this can be found in Mommsen, “Funktion des Antisemitismus,” p. 186

⁸⁶ Max Domarus, *Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945*, Munich, 1965, vol. 2, p. 1058.