

Russian Collaboration with the Nazis and the Holocaust

The Issue.

The history of Soviet collaboration, and its Russian aspect in particular, remains a painful and considerably politicised issue in Russia. If, prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, practically all those who had co-operated with the Germans during the war had been seen as traitors, then from 1991 a tendency to present these very same people virtually as heroes has appeared. This is particularly noticeable in the Ukraine and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). In Russia, the rehabilitation of collaborators has not taken such an exaggerated form, though the notion that these people were victims of two regimes, and that they in some way were fighting both against Hitler and Stalin, has become very popular. They are also supposed to have fought without, as one might say, getting their hands dirty, the organisation and carrying out of terror being exclusively the province of the SS and the SD. Strictly speaking, the version of history that is being spread in Russia is the one which was dominant in Western historiography between the 1950s and 1970s, and which, obviously, was widely represented in the memoirs and literature of the Vlasovites, German veterans and so on. If one examines the proffered explanation closely, it is clear that it differs in only two respects from the Nazi propaganda that armed all collaborators with the idea of “fighting for freedom, fighting against bolshevism”. Firstly, there is the notion that they were compelled to co-operate with the Germans, that they were essentially opposed to Nazism and that they even acted against Hitler in their own way. Secondly, it is suggested that they did not take part in punitive activities, and particularly had nothing to do with any anti-Semitic actions. Some researchers go as far as to attribute the collaborators’ pro-Nazi pronouncements and publications in their entirety as being exclusively the result of pressure from their German commanders. The fact that there were quite a number of such pronouncements has led Catherine Andreev of Oxford, for example, one of the historians of the Vlasov Movement, to a paradoxical conclusion, suggesting that readers search for the Vlasovites’ true ideas by

reading between the lines. Precisely *which* lines we are supposed to read between, however, is something she seems to be unable to point out.

In my study of the causes and the scale of Russian collaboration, I set myself the task of showing how the German authorities made use of collaborators, including with regard to their anti-Jewish policies.

Sources and Methodology.

Since the 1990s, historians have gained access to a whole new range of materials. In the first place, with the opening up of archives in the former GDR, the Czech Republic, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states, scholars have found themselves presented with a large number of new documents captured from Nazi Germany. In Russia, a whole archive of captured documents, the so-called Special Archive, has been opened up, as have party archives in the countries of the former USSR containing documents relating to the partisan movement, the activities of the party in occupied territories, reports on the crimes of the occupying regime and so on. With the decentralisation of the former KGB archives it has become possible to study the investigations of collaborators, stenographers' records of trials, and the sentences imposed. Although such materials do, as a rule, have an obviously accusatory tendency to them, they none the less serve to substantially improve our understanding of what went on in the occupied territories.

All occupied countries have had to deal with the issue of collaboration. For probably the first time in history, the aggressor (the Nazis) had planned ahead of time how it would exploit captured countries, create a loyal executive administration and physically annihilate large sections of the population, which, according to the ideology of the Reich, were "hostile" in a racial or political sense. The intensive and large-scale destruction of "undesirable and hostile elements" began with the carrying out of Operation Barbarossa, and thus the nature of collaboration during the Soviet-German war took on its own particular peculiarities. Those collaborating with the occupying forces on the Eastern front were continually required to demonstrate their loyalty, and since terror was part

and parcel of everyday life and an essential element of the “New Order”, it was the case that all collaborators must, to some degree or other, have done their bit to support the occupying regime. In my view, there was no such thing as “innocent” or “unwitting” collaboration. Collaboration is always a conscious choice, and it is that which distinguishes it from all other forms of relations between the population and the occupying power.

Of course, collaboration also took a variety of forms. In my own research, I distinguish between military-political, administrative and civil or economic collaboration. To a certain degree differentiating them in this way is conventional, though it does serve to provide us with a picture, so to speak, of various different groups’ spheres of activity in the service of the occupying regime.

The fierce character of resistance in the war years has left a strong impression on the documents of the period, and researchers must be extremely cautious in their work. In making generalisations and drawing conclusions, it is essential to adopt a critical approach to the materials available, and, when possible, to compare them with other materials. Sadly, many of those who witnessed the war years are gone from us forever, and millions died, but the materials available to modern historians in the archives of the former USSR and in Western collections are enough to demonstrate the unenviable role played by Russian collaborators, including their part in the Holocaust.

The use of the term “Russian” may present a little difficulty in all this. It is well known that the Germans did not only use Russians on the territory of the Russian Federation. Russians also served in the police in Mogilev, Minsk and Kharkov, worked as guards in the concentration camps in Poland, and even counted themselves among those serving in the Latvian police and the Arâjs SS unit. Therefore, along with the geography of the question, I also pay attention to Russian collaboration beyond the borders of Russia, including in other countries (the Russian Corps in Serbia, Russian emigrants in France, etc.).

Russians in the police, the Wehrmacht and the SS.

Marching into Russian territory, the German command had already acquired a certain amount of experience in creating government bodies in Belarus, the

Baltic states and the Ukraine, and things were done in more or less the same way in Russia. In the countryside, village elders were appointed, and burgomasters were set up in office in the towns. Since practically the whole territory of Russia was under military administration, the local administration existed in parallel with its ruling German counterpart, while, at the same time, doing its bidding. Despite the ideological bias against Russians (untermenschen), the Germans began to use them to form police forces from the very first days of the occupation, and, as a rule, these police forces were armed from their very inception, and it is perfectly understandable why this was done. From the winter of 1941 to the end of 1942, the front line stretched for almost three thousand kilometres. Such an enormous area resulted in the wide dispersal of the German army's forces, and required large human resources to maintain the security of the rear. The local police were intended to bear part of this burden, but their role was far from neutral, since one of their functions was to engage in the struggle with the opponents of the Reich. These, as we know, included communists, Jews, gypsies and the intelligentsia. Moreover, in the east, the Jews, in the view of the Nazis, were both ethnic and political enemies ("Judo-Bolsheviks", "Jewish marauders", "Jewish partisans" and so on).

The Russian police, in the same way as their colleagues in the Ukraine and in the Baltic states, actively assisted the occupying forces in all anti-Jewish activities. While the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen (EG A, EG B) were regretfully pointing out that fewer and fewer Jews were being found the further they advanced eastward, and the population were passive, this did nothing to diminish their zeal for hunting down and killing Jews. The local police provided an invaluable service, since they knew precisely where Jewish families and Jewish specialists lived. Judging by the contents of Russian regional archives (Pskov, Smolensk, Bryansk and Kursk), Russian police officers helped out in the tracking down of Jews everywhere. Together with the village elders, they would inform on local inhabitants who helped Jews, and there are known cases in which policemen knowingly reported that individuals were concealing Jews in order to acquire their property. At post-war hearings, many officers denied that they had acted in such a way because they had anti-Semitic beliefs, but pointed out that they "understood what they had to do".

One of the peculiarities of the occupying regime's activity on Russian territory was that practically no ghettos were created. All groups of Jews were isolated and liquidated very quickly. In the south (the Crimea and the Caucasus) this was sometimes achieved within one or two weeks. The local police played a definite role in all the mass shootings (Smolensk, Rostov on Don, Mineralnie Vodi), and, according to the reports of witnesses and information in the FSB archive, there were always volunteers willing to take part in executions. According to approximate calculations, the Germans killed around 90 – 100,000 Jews on Russian territory.

As the German army pulled out, police officers were provided with “new work”, with a considerable number being recruited into new Wehrmacht units, the SS, or being sent to work in Germany.

Because of the racial and ideological convictions of Nazi Germany's leadership, it was some time before armed Russian units were created, with the first being formally sanctioned Cossack units. For some strange reason, the Germans did not consider Cossacks to be Slavs. It is likely that the emigration of Cossacks to Germany in the '20s and '30s played some part in this, cultivating the notion that they were a separate nation, and that they were in some way the descendants of ancient peoples. It was believed that with Germany's help they would be able to found their own state of “Kazakia”. There was a widespread feeling of anti-Semitism and anti-communism among the Cossacks, and on the whole they greeted the news of Germany's attack on the USSR with rejoicing. In the autumn of 1941, the so-called “Russian Corps” was formed with Cossack volunteers and Russian emigrants, and was sent to Yugoslavia to do battle with “Jewish-bolshevism” and the “American (i.e. Jewish) plutocrats”. The Russian Corps became a genuine punitive unit. Thousands of peaceful citizens, including women and children, died at the hands of the Cossacks.

Also in the autumn of 1941, small Cossack detachments were created on the Eastern Front. These were used to defend the rear, and gradually came to be drawn into the struggle with partisans. Part of the surviving archives relating to these detachments (in Minsk and in the FSB archive in Moscow) bears witness to the intensive Nazi propaganda that they were exposed to, and this propaganda found a definite response due to the belief of some Cossacks that the Soviet authorities' repression of them in the aftermath of the October Revolution had a

Jewish connection (Trotsky). The upshot of this was that, in 1944, the Germans created a new division from the “Soviet Cossacks”, commanded by the German Count von Panwitz. This division was also used for punitive purposes, but gradually fell apart. After the war, von Panwitz was given up to Moscow by the British, and was put on trial there. Extensive evidence of the crimes of von Panwitz’s division was presented to the court, including photographs of people who had been hung. Von Panwitz did not deny his guilt, and was, in accordance with the court’s verdict, executed along with other prominent Cossacks. Nonetheless, fifty years later, Yeltsin’s government found this to have been unjust. At the insistence of the German general’s relatives and the Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Repression, under the leadership of A. N. Yakovlev, a former member of the Politburo, a lawsuit was initiated, and in 1996 von Panwitz was rehabilitated in Russia. As far as I am aware, this is the only case in the world where a war criminal was rehabilitated in the post-war period. Moreover, in Russia it was done quietly and secretly, so as not to give rise to any unnecessary discussion.

In September 1941, at the behest of the Abwehr, and with the agreement of the command of the 16th German army, a Russian battalion was founded under the command of B. A. Smyslovskiy (alias Holm’ston, alias von Regenau). This was a unit that selected and trained agents for Abwehr detachments. It might appear that intelligence work is a long way from terror, though surviving archives relating to the unit’s command (FSB, Podolsk and Freiburg) show that all Abwehr detachments, at least in northern Russia, took part in the Nazi terror. Via their “V-Leute”, the detachments’ leaders sought out partisans, Jews, gypsies, and those who helped them. The leaders of the detachments personally passed sentence. Those who passed through Smyslovskiy’s “school” were always astounded that his apartment was crammed with expensive goods, as if it were some kind of warehouse. Smyslovskiy himself said that he had “swapped the stuff with the Jews”. Later, he would refer to his own paramilitary unit using the terms “the People’s” or “Liberating”. After the war Smyslovskiy did all he could to avoid justice, and it would appear that he very swiftly (and not without the help of the goods he had “swapped with the Jews”) took off to Brazil, where he published articles on his “struggle for freedom”.

One of the first armed units made up from the local Russian population was a police unit that subsequently came to be known as “Kaminsky Brigade”. It was formed in November 1941 in the small settlement of Lokot, in the Orel region, and its history is told in some detail in some western works (Dallin, Schulte). In my view, however, these authors are wrong in their assumptions regarding the apolitical nature of the brigade. On the 17th of October 1941, the German command appointed Constantine Voskoboinikov (born 1895, holding a law degree from Moscow University) as burgomaster of the Lokot district, and as his deputy, Bronislav Kaminski, a 37-year-old Pole, who at the onset of the war had worked as an engineer at the Lokot spirits factory. On the 25th of November, with the permission of the German command, Voskoboinikov announced the founding of a pro-Nazi party, the People’s Socialist Party of Russia. The party’s manifesto consisted of twelve points, eleven of which laid out the principles for the destruction of the communist system and the collective farming system in Russia. One point, however, called for “the merciless annihilation of the Jews and former commissars”. On the 8th of January 1942, the partisans killed Voskoboinikov. To judge by records of the investigations of the brigade’s members in the former KGB archive, then Kaminsky made the People’s Socialist Party the official party of his own police garrison after Voskoboinikov’s death. Each new recruit was required to sign the “party’s” manifesto, and swear allegiance to the both the German Fuhrer and their own, that is to say, to Kaminsky himself. What happened subsequently is well known. The brigade gradually fell apart, and, after the suppression of the Warsaw uprising, it was disbanded. The Germans killed Kaminsky themselves, and the majority of the brigade’s former members formed the first two divisions of the “Russian Liberation Army”.

It is interesting that despite several attempts during the first year of the war, the Germans were unable to find a suitable leader who would have been able to serve as a focus for the Russians’ desire to collaborate. A likely candidate did appear, however, in 1942, when General Lieutenant A. A. Vlasov was captured. Almost immediately, Vlasov started making contacts, and, within six or seven weeks of his capture, accepted an offer from the Wehrmacht’s propaganda unit and began to co-operate. After the war, during his trial in Moscow, Vlasov admitted that he had acted out of cowardice, and that he had wanted only to

survive. It is an explanation that has the ring of truth, though after having changed sides and accepting the German's rules, his pronouncements soon took on an anti-Semitic character. Of course, one can assert, like C. Andreev, that Vlasov himself did not write or sign most of the leaflets that were produced, and that all the "bad" passages (anti-Semitic) were the work of the Germans, and that all the "good" passages (anti-Stalin) were Vlasov's, but there is no convincing evidence that this was the case. Indeed, the opposite seems more likely. At the propaganda school in Dabendorf, near Berlin, where Vlasov often spoke, the whole of the short instruction course was shot through with anti-Semitic propaganda, but this brought no objection from Vlasov. All those within the General's close circle (Zhilenkov, Malyshkin) continually made reference to their struggle against "Yiddish Freemasonry", "Jewish plutocrats" and so on. Was Vlasov an anti-Semite before he went over to the Germans? There is not a hint of any such thing in his personal documents. He was a party member, educated in the ideals of internationalism, and undoubtedly committed to Stalin. After having fought for a whole year in the Red Army, Vlasov received secret reports on German policies and on the annihilation of Jews and prisoners, and was outraged by them. His personal correspondence with his wives (Vlasov was a bigamist) has survived, and it is obvious from this that the General was consumed by the desire to take revenge on the fascists ("We will drive out the Germans", "We'll still show them"). One may be completely entitled, therefore, to characterise Vlasov's actions as betrayal. He agreed to serve the Nazis, and knowingly and willingly made that choice.

A figure of Vlasov's type was vital to the Germans. By the end of 1942 around half a million persons recruited from the inhabitants of occupied territories and prisoners-of-war were already serving in the police force and in the Wehrmacht. It is difficult to say how many of these were Russians, but it is perfectly clear that the majority were Russian speakers, and therefore Vlasov was called upon to become a symbol of the unity of their struggle on the side of their German "allies", while at the same time presenting the idea of Nazism to them in suitable packaging, and in the Russian language. Also, a large number of propagandists were trained at breakneck speed (for two to three months) in special schools to work on this project.

The so-called “Hilfswillige” (abbreviated to “Hiwi”) are also deserving of attention. There is practically nothing written about this widespread group of “volunteer helpers” despite the fact that in various years they accounted for between 10 and 20% of the German army’s number. Representatives of all the nationalities of occupied Europe could be found among the ranks of the Hiwi, and on the Eastern Front they were, as a rule, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Russians, Poles and Czechs. They were in no sense a neutral element, and total obedience and diligence were demanded of them. Although they did not have the right to bear arms, the soldiers of the Red Army time and again captured armed Hiwi at the end of the war. Around the autumn of 1942, all “helpers” were required to swear an oath of allegiance to the Fuhrer. The text of the oath, it would appear, depended on the command of the particular German division concerned. Sometimes the texts made mention of the struggle against “Jews and communists”, though the main point, i. e. that the Hiwi were obliged to carry out all the German commands orders, and that they would be punished in accordance with the laws of wartime should they fail to do so, was always present. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Hiwi served as a ready made means for the forming of armed units (legions, eastern battalions and so on) from different ethnic groups. Anti-Jewish propaganda was carried out on a perpetual basis among the Hiwi. They regularly received Russian-language Nazi newspapers, and Vlasov’s propagandists would deliver lectures on the role of the Jews in the war, on Jews in the USSR, about Stalin and the Jews and so on. What kind of influence did such propaganda have, and did it hit home in some way? Further research needs to be done on such questions. We can at least say that the surviving reports prepared by Vlasov’s propagandists make no reference to any instances of protest or disagreement with anti-Semitic propaganda. True, one could ascribe this to the unwillingness of the Hiwi to attract attention to them, since, as a rule, Vlasov’s emissaries would report anything of that kind to the security services.

The question of the Eastern Battalions has also seen little in the way of research. The Eastern Battalions (more commonly known as Osttruppen) were those units that were created on the Eastern Front and which, in 1943, because of numerous cases of mass desertion, were transferred to the Western Front. As a rule, they

were small subdivisions responsible for guarding communications and roads in the German army's rear, as well as, when required, being used by the rear command or the SD to do battle with partisans. It cannot be doubted that there were members of these units who took part in the shootings of Jews, and a number of cases involving former police officers bear witness to this. For them, joining the Osttruppen had seemed preferable to serving in the Hiwi or being sent off to work in Germany. All in all, the Osttruppen were extremely motley, ill-assorted groups of individuals, and knowing this, the German command took active measures to strengthen their ideological motivation. It was the Osttruppen that saw the most frequent visits from Vlasov's propagandists, and many of them immediately registered with the Eastern Battalions immediately on completing their training. The active encouragement of anti-Semitism, as in other divisions of the Wehrmacht, was an essential element in the general political preparation of the eastern forces. However, this did nothing to improve the fighting spirit of the "volunteers". Along with a high level of desertion (as much as 20% in certain units), whole divisions would give themselves up on coming into contact with American or British forces, and sometimes whole battalions would go straight over to the other side. Moreover, and to the great distaste of the German command, the deserters killed German soldiers and officers. In the course of interrogations, the "volunteers" who found themselves in American or British captivity expressed, almost to a man, their hatred of the Germans. No one allowed himself or herself to make any anti-Semitic comments. However, it is interesting that while ordinary soldiers and lower-ranking officers would express their desire to return to their homeland, the majority of commanders and all propagandists asked for permission to remain and live in the West. The allies attributed this to "anti-communism" and "the attraction of democratic values", but perhaps there were other reasons? Unfortunately, at the time, neither the intelligence services nor the prison camp authorities asked questions concerning these people's histories. It is possible that the Eastern Battalions' archives could shed much light on these matters, and it is known that much of this documentation fell into the hands of the allies. It is remarkable, however, that even fifty-five years since the end of the war these documents remain classified in both the USA and Great Britain.

I would like to draw attention to one important point; Wartime collaboration developed in such a way that finally all the more or less large units (the Cossacks, Kaminsky Brigade, Vlasov etc.) came under the control of the SS, and Reichsfurher Himmler personally, and none of those concerned objected to this. On the contrary, they all took great pride in it, seeing it a great achievement.

Anti-Jewish Propaganda and the Role of the Local Authorities.

Having “cleansed” the territory of Jewish “elements”, the local administration would find itself facing an important task – to cultivate an anti-Jewish spirit in the local population while mopping up the last of the Jews in hiding. According to my figures, around two hundred Russian-language newspapers and magazines were published in the occupied territories, and of course, all these publications were answerable to, and controlled by the German administration, which served as a conduit for regular reports from the German command, articles from the Ministry of Propaganda and the Ministry for the Occupied territories. Some materials would arrive already in Russian, while others needed to be translated. All the same, regardless of the strict monitoring and censorship in force, the Russian publications were granted a certain level of independence as far as anti-Jewish propaganda was concerned. Even such strictly censored newspapers for “Vlasov’s army” as Zarya (Dawn) and Dobrovolets (The Volunteer) could allow themselves to publish extracts from Trotsky’s book on Stalin (Trotsky was a Jew). But Zarya and Dobrovolets were printed in Berlin. In Russia, editors and journalists had the opportunity to choose anti-Semitic material themselves and commission caricatures from local artists. Almost every edition would feature some kind of anti-Jewish material in the form of articles, jokes or caricatures. Of course, one could put this down to pressure from the Germans, but if anything could be pointed out as being an expression of Russian “creativity”, then it would be anti-Jewish rhymes. For all the Germans’ refinement, they could not write Russian verse. As a rule, these took the form of quatrains, or more often chastushki (two- or four-line usually humorous rhymes similar in spirit to the limerick) ridiculing Jews, Stalin and the Soviet authorities. From an artistic point of view, these were low standard efforts aimed at the local anti-Semite and the poorly educated. Here are a few examples:

Жи́ды пьют и гуля́ют,
А русские слезы утира́ют.

Я на бочке си́жу,
А под бочко́й каша,
Не подумайте жи́ды,
Что Росси́я ваша.

В Красно́й Армии бойцы́,
Голодали́ без е́ды;
Мясо с салом бере́гли
Комисса́ры и жи́ды.

Почему Стали́н твоя́ не победа́?
Потому́, что ты спал с жи́довкой до обеда́.

The Yids drink and have a good time,
While the Russians wipe tears from their eyes.

I'm sitting on a barrel,
And under the barrel there's some kasha (porridge),
Yids, don't take it into your heads,
That Russia belongs to you.

In the Red Army, the soldiers
Were starving without any food;
All the meat and the pork-fat
Was in the hands of the commissars and Jews.

Why isn't victory yours, Stalin?
Because you slept with a Yid woman before your dinner.

It is hardly possible to establish the authorship of such rhymes, and it is entirely likely that some of them were composed before the war began. However, it could only have been the Russians themselves who preserved them and made them known to the Germans.

Punishment.

All those who co-operated with the Germans, whether they were captured by the Red Army or remained at liberty in the liberated territories, had to answer for what they had done. Those who were discovered in the heat of the action by advance units of the Red Army suffered a particularly unpleasant fate. Those caught in German uniform could be shot on the spot, even despite officers' orders, though in 1945, on German territory itself, several officers themselves initiated shootings, and the Soviet command had to issue special orders to put an end to such arbitrariness. In 1943, military counterintelligence units in the army ("SMERSH" – from the Russian "Smert Shpionam" - "Death to Spies") were created, and, as a rule, it was their responsibility to carry out the initial interrogations and investigations of those suspected of collaboration. If it was found that the suspect had taken part in the executions of Soviet citizens, then the matter would either immediately be passed on to a military tribunal or would be decided by the commander of the division concerned. Such people could be publicly executed in the presence of the inhabitants of the place where they had committed their crimes, and sometimes both Russians and Germans were punished in this way. If there were no compromising materials regarding a police officer or Hiwi, and witnesses confirmed that the suspect had not taken part in acts of terror, then they could, at the commander's discretion, enrol in the division in question, and this opportunity was exploited by some collaborators. There were cases where one and the same person succeeded in serving two years in the German police and two years in the Red Army, with some even managing to be awarded medals by both sides! However, such people were gradually exposed. The NKVD, SMERSH and the KGB together compiled a detailed list of names of those suspected of participating in executions, and the KGB continued its investigation and prosecution of such people practically up to the very last days of its existence.

So how many people were punished for collaboration in the Soviet Union? Unfortunately, detailed figures are not yet available. The Russian Ministry of Defence, which owns the military archives, guards its secrets no less jealously than its Soviet equivalent. However, since the dissolution of the USSR, party and state archives have been opened up (though still not completely) in the other former republics, as well as in Russia itself, and it is possible to surmise that the total number of those brought to justice through the courts is somewhere in the region of 400-450,000. It is not yet possible to break these figures down by nationality. Of course, the forced exiles of the peoples of the Caucasus and Crimea cannot be considered as part of this, since they occurred as the result of a political, non-judicial decision.

To finish, we must address ourselves to the eternal question – Why? How was it that perfectly ordinary people turned into the kind of people who could carry out such monstrous orders, taking the lives of thousands? What possible motives could have driven them to do it? To judge by Soviet investigations, more often than not, war criminals explained that they had behaved pragmatically, out of fear, because they had wanted to survive. Some spoke openly of their feelings of enmity toward the Soviet authorities. However, I have never once come across a case where the accused explained that he had done what he did because of anti-Semitic feelings. It is entirely possible that people had no desire to speak openly about such things before a Soviet court, but to prove their real motives is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, archive documents do show that for many collaborators, taking part in executions was an important step in confirming their loyalty to the occupying power. In a number of cases the Germans deliberately ordered collaborators to shoot Jews, and then observed closely how they coped with their task. A German officer ordered one of the Travniki guards to shoot a Jewish woman and her child, and he quickly carried out the order. After the war, a Soviet investigator was questioning the killer, trying to understand what he had felt. For a long time, there was no reply, but at last he answered briefly: “The Germans made an animal out of me.” Brutalisation, being transformed into something less than human – that too, evidently, is one of the aspects of Nazism and collaboration.